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Abstract
Data Exploitation and Privacy Protection in the Era of Data Sharing
Lihi Idan
2021
As the amount, complexity, and value of data available in both private and public sectors has risen sharply, the competing goals of data privacy and data utility have challenged
both organizations and individuals. This dissertation addresses both goals.
First, we consider the task of interorganizational data sharing, in which data owners,
data clients, and data subjects have different and sometimes competing privacy concerns.
A key challenge in this type of scenario is that each organization uses its own set of proprietary, intraorganizational attributes to describe the shared data; such attributes cannot be
shared with other organizations. Moreover, data-access policies are determined by multiple parties and may be specified using attributes that are not directly comparable with the
ones used by the owner to specify the data.
We propose a system architecture and a suite of protocols that facilitate dynamic and
efficient interorganizational data sharing, while allowing each party to use its own set of
proprietary attributes to describe the shared data and preserving confidentiality of both
data records and attributes. We introduce the novel technique of attribute-based encryption with oblivious attribute translation (OTABE), which plays a crucial role in our solution
and may prove useful in other applications. This extension of attribute-based encryption
uses semi-trusted proxies to enable dynamic and oblivious translation between proprietary
attributes that belong to different organizations. We prove that our OTABE-based framework is secure in the standard model and provide two real-world use cases.
Next, we turn our attention to utility that can be derived from the vast and growing
amount of data about individuals that is available on social media. As social networks
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(SNs) continue to grow in popularity, it is essential to understand what can be learned
about personal attributes of SN users by mining SN data.
The first SN-mining problem we consider is how best to predict the voting behavior
of SN users. Prior work only considered users who generate politically oriented content
or voluntarily disclose their political preferences online. We avoid this bias by using a
novel type of Bayesian-network (BN) model that combines demographic, behavioral, and
social features. We test our method in a predictive analysis of the 2016 U.S. Presidential
election. Our work is the first to take a semi-supervised approach in this setting. Using the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm, we combine labeled survey data with
unlabeled Facebook data, thus obtaining larger datasets and addressing self-selection bias.
The second SN-mining challenge we address is the extent to which Dynamic Bayesian
Networks (DBNs) can infer dynamic behavioral intentions such as the intention to get
a vaccine or to apply for a loan. Knowledge of such intentions has great potential to
improve the design of recommendation systems, ad-targeting mechanisms, public-health
campaigns, and other social and commercial endeavors. We focus on the question of how
to infer an SN user’s offline decisions and intentions using only the public portions of her
online SN accounts.
Our contribution is twofold. First, we use BNs and several behavioral-psychology
techniques to model decision making as a complex process that both influences and is
influenced by static factors (such as personality traits and demographic categories) and
dynamic factors (such as triggering events, interests, and emotions). Second, we explore
the extent to which temporal models may assist in the inference task by representing SN
users as sets of DBNs that are built using our modeling techniques. The use of DBNs,
together with data gathered in multiple waves, has the potential to improve both inference
accuracy and prediction accuracy in future time slots. It may also shed light on the extent
to which different factors influence the decision-making process.

Data Exploitation and Privacy Protection in the Era of Data Sharing

A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of
Yale University
in Candidacy for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by
Lihi Idan
Dissertation Director: Joan Feigenbaum
December 2021

Copyright c 2021 by Lihi Idan
All rights reserved.

ii

Contents
1

2

Introduction

1

1.1

Dissertation overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

1.2

Technical background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

1.2.1

Attribute-based encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

1.2.2

Bayesian networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

1.2.3

Dynamic Bayesian networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

Privacy-preserving data sharing

9

2.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

2.1.1

Problem description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

2.1.2

Starting point: attribute-based encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

2.1.3

Main contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

Background and motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

2.2.1

Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

2.2.2

Use cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

2.2

2.3

2.4

Attribute-based encryption with oblivious attribute
translation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

2.3.1

Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

2.3.2

Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

System model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

iii

2.4.1

System participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

2.4.2

Revocation mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

2.4.3

Main flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

Security definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33

2.5.1

Goals and trust relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33

2.5.2

Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

Construction overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38

2.6.1

Main OTABE techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38

2.6.2

Other components of PRShare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41

Detailed construction and translation function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

44

2.7.1

Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

44

2.7.2

Translation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

2.8

Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

56

2.9

Implementation and evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

72

2.10 The q-DBDH assumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

74

Social-network mining to infer voters’ intentions

75

3.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

75

3.1.1

Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

76

3.1.2

Shortcomings of prior research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77

3.1.3

Our contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

78

3.2

Methodology and datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

80

3.3

The Bayesian network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

84

3.4

Handling incomplete data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88

3.5

Combining link information: The FULL model . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91

3.5.1

Enriching the static subnetwork . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

92

3.5.2

Creating the social subnetwork . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

94

2.5

2.6

2.7

3

iv

3.6
4

Inferring behavioral intentions of social-network users

95
100

4.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

4.2

Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

4.3

5

Experimental results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4.2.1

Key ideas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

4.2.2

Data collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.3.1

Second-layer features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

4.3.2

Network features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

4.3.3

Linguistic features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

4.4

Feature selection and model selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

4.5

Moving from static to dynamic models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

4.6

Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

4.7

Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

Conclusions and open problems

123

5.1

Privacy-preserving data sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

5.2

Social-network mining to predict voting behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

5.3

Inferring behavioral intentions of social-network users . . . . . . . . . . 125

v

List of Figures
2.1

Typical running times in seconds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71

3.1

The BASIC model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

83

3.2

The REVISED model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

3.3

The FULL model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91

3.4

Overall classification accuracy among different classifiers . . . . . . . . .

98

4.1

Our general intention-inference model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

4.2

A DBN representation of various intentions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

4.3

Average ROC AUC scores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

vi

List of Tables
2.1

Properties of Proxy-Assisted ABE Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

2.2

Summary of notations and symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

3.1

Descriptive statistics for D1 and D2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

82

3.2

Fraction of users (D2) whose public profile contains various attributes . .

87

3.3

Comparison of the overall classification accuracy using different training
configurations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

3.4

Detailed results for the Bayesian network models presented in this chapter

97

4.1

Datasets’ statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

4.2

Results of the DBN models presented in this chapter . . . . . . . . . . . 118

vii

Acknowledgments
First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Joan Feigenbaum, for
her thoughtful guidance and for letting me choose my own path and develop my personal
research interests. I would also like to thank Professor David Gelernter for fascinating
teaching experiences and for great conversations that led me to some of the ideas developed
in this thesis.
The research in this dissertation was supported in part by grants CNS-1409599 and
CNS-1407454 from the US National Science Foundation and grant 2016-3834 from the
William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.

viii

This dissertation is dedicated to my dear father, Dr. Asher Idan, for his support, his
encouragement, and his eternal optimism.

Chapter 1
Introduction
In many rule-of-law societies, citizens have a right to privacy. Even in the US, where
the Bill of Rights does not contain the word “privacy,” the Fourth Amendment1 prohibits
unreasonable government intrusions into citizens’ homes and belongings, and it has led
to many court decisions that are privacy enhancing. As the number of news stories about
hacks and data breaches clearly demonstrates, people are very concerned about loss of
control over their personal information.
As the Internet (and, in particular, Big Tech firms) have become dominant in citizens’
daily lives, however, privacy has ceased to be a right and became a commodity. Unlike
most commodities, privacy is not bought with money but rather with limited or even no
ability to use common and essential services. In order to use Facebook, Uber, or even a
credit card, people reveal personal data that are subsequently shared with other organizations without their explicit permission. Sometimes people explicitly agree that service
providers may share their personal information with other organizations, because it is the
only obvious way to complete transactions that they need to complete in order to get on
with their daily lives. In both of these common scenarios, the information revealed al1

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”
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lows some of our most personal attributes to be inferred. It has been argued that people’s
willingness to use services that collect and share their personal information means that
they accept the privacy risks entailed in doing so and regard them simply as the price of
receiving service for which they do not have to pay money. We question the soundness of
this argument, because many people do not know what information they routinely reveal
or with whom it is shared.
For example, healthcare providers create electronic medical records (EMRs) for all
patients and share them with other organizations for various purposes. Do patients know
with whom their EMRs are shared and why? The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA [1]) limits access to EMRs by parties outside of the healthcare
organizations that create them. However, it imposes very weak restrictions on access by
those inside of the organizations; specifically, HIPAA requires only that internal access
be granted on a “need-to-know basis.” This requirement is routinely understood to allow
internal access not only by doctors and nurses, as may seem intuitive to many patients, but
by many other types of in-house employees such as administrators and IT-staff members.
Limits on external access do not prevent sharing with “business associates” such as billing
companies, insurance companies, collections agencies, practice-management companies,
IT consultants, and many more.
It is also unclear how seriously and consistently HIPAA rules are enforced. Numerous
HIPAA violations are reported every year.2 The actual number of violations may be significantly higher. Some violations go unnoticed, and some may not be reported because of
fear of lawsuits or bad publicity.
Another domain in which people may overestimate the extent to which their personal information is protected is that of credit reports. The Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA [36]) empowers consumer-reporting agencies such as Experian and Equifax to
2

See, e.g., the example of this Ohio hospital: https://healthitsecurity.com/news/
ohio-hospital-hipaa-violation-goes-unnoticed-for-over-a-decade.
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collect and maintain financial information about individuals and to create credit reports
that lenders and other merchants can use to gauge individuals’ creditworthiness. Contrary
to many people’s intuitive understanding, the FCRA allows consumer-reporting agencies
to grant access to a person’s credit report without that person’s explicit consent, as long
as the report is to be used for a “permissible purpose.” This term is not defined, and the
rule is not enforced in a uniform, global manner – a state of affairs that has led to several
serious data breaches and privacy violations [16, 37].
Perhaps the most extreme example of the commodified nature of privacy occurs on
social networks (SNs), where people voluntarily share a lot of personal information. In
principle, the Cambridge Analytica scandal [2] made people aware of the fact that the
information that they explicitly share on SNs can be given to the SNs’ “partners,” including
but not limited to advertisers; one could argue, therefore, that active SN users accept this
practice. However, it is unlikely that they know the extent to which information that they
voluntarily publish (as well as their decisions not to publish certain information) can be
used to infer their private decisions and intentions.
This dissertation addresses two complementary challenges posed by our commodified
information environment: First, we provide a data-sharing framework that protects the
privacy of data owners, data users, and data subjects; second, we provide SN-mining techniques that enable governments, companies, and other organizations to infer SN users’
offline decisions and intentions from the users’ publicly observable SN data.

1.1

Dissertation overview

In Chapter 2, we consider the task of interorganizational data sharing, in which data owners, data clients, and data subjects have different and sometimes competing privacy concerns. One real-world scenario in which this problem arises concerns law-enforcement
use of phone-call metadata: The data owner is a phone company, the data clients are law-
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enforcement agencies, and the data subjects are individuals who make phone calls. A key
challenge in this type of scenario is that each organization uses its own set of proprietary
intraorganizational attributes to describe the shared data; such attributes cannot be shared
with other organizations. Moreover, data-access policies are determined by multiple parties and may be specified using attributes that are not directly comparable with the ones
used by the owner to specify the data.
We propose a system architecture and a suite of protocols that facilitate dynamic and
efficient interorganizational data sharing, while allowing each party to use its own set of
proprietary attributes to describe the shared data and preserving confidentiality of both data
records and proprietary intraorganizational attributes. We introduce the novel technique
of attribute-based encryption with oblivious attribute translation (OTABE), which plays a
crucial role in our solution. This extension of attribute-based encryption uses semi-trusted
proxies to enable dynamic and oblivious translation between proprietary attributes that
belong to different organizations; it supports hidden access policies, direct revocation, and
fine-grained, data-centric keys and queries. We prove that our OTABE-based framework
is secure in the standard model and provide two real-world use cases.
The material in Chapter 2 has been published in [58, 59].
In Chapter 3, we introduce our novel approach to SN mining. Increasing use of social media in political campaigns raises the question of whether one can predict the voting behavior of SN users. Prior work on this problem considered only the minority of
users who generate politically oriented content or voluntarily disclose their political preferences online, thus introducing substantial bias. We avoid this bias by using a novel
Bayesian-network (BN) model that combines demographic, behavioral, and social features. We test our approach in a predictive analysis of the 2016 US Presidential election.
Our model is highly extensible and facilitates the use of incomplete datasets. Furthermore,
our work is the first to apply a semi-supervised approach to this task: Using an expectationmaximization (EM) algorithm, we combine labeled survey data with unlabeled Facebook
4

data, thus obtaining larger datasets as well as addressing self-selection bias.
The material in Chapter 3 has been published in [57].
In Chapter 4, we generalize our BN approach to SN mining by asking what can be
learned about personal attributes of SN users (beyond their voting behavior) by mining
their publicly observable SN data. Previous work in this area focused on the inference
of time-invariant attributes such as personality, demographic categories, and ideology. By
contrast, we study the extent to which BNs and Dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBNs) can
infer dynamic behavioral intentions in areas such as health care and finance. Knowledge
of such intentions has great potential to improve the design of recommendation systems,
ad-targeting mechanisms, public-health campaigns, and other social and commercial endeavors.
Our contribution to this type of intention inference is twofold. First, we use BNs
and several behavioral-psychology techniques to model decision making as a complex
process that both influences and is influenced by static factors (such as personality traits
and demographic categories) and dynamic factors (such as triggering events, interests, and
emotions). Second, we explore the extent to which temporal models may assist in the
inference task by representing SN users as sets of DBNs that are built using our modeling
techniques. The use of DBNs, together with data gathered in multiple waves, has the
potential to improve both inference accuracy and prediction accuracy in future time slots.
It may also shed light on the extent to which different factors influence the decision-making
process.
The material in Chapter 4 has been submitted for publication and is under review.
Finally, in Chapter 5, we present conclusions and directions for further research.
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1.2

Technical background

In this dissertation, we make extensive use of three technical building blocks: attributebased encryption, Bayesian networks, and dynamic Bayesian networks. We give brief
introductions to these building blocks here and provide pointers to more extensive treatments.

1.2.1

Attribute-based encryption

An attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme is a type of public-key encryption scheme.
In an ABE scheme, plaintexts are encrypted under access policies that are composed of
attributes. In addition, potential decryptors receive secret keys, composed of attributes as
well; typically, these are user-centric attributes in the sense that they represent decryptors’ identities or roles within the enterprise that is using the ABE scheme. For instance:
IS-IN-CS-DEPARTMENT, CLEARANCE-LEVEL=HIGHEST, etc. One or more trusted
authorities (TAs) issue secret keys to potential decryptors that are based on the decryptors’
attribute sets. A user will be able to decrypt a ciphertext if and only if the set of attributes
that her key represents satisfies the access policy under which the plaintext was encrypted.
This is called ciphertext-policy ABE.
By contrast, key-policy ABE works in reverse: Users’ keys are based on access policies, and plaintexts are encrypted under sets of attributes. A key-policy ABE scheme that
involves multiple TAs is called a multi-authority, key-policy ABE (MA-KP-ABE) scheme.
MA-KP-ABE is our technical starting point in PRShare, a framework for privacypreserving, interorganizational data sharing that we present in Chapter 2. We start with
the single-authority KP-ABE scheme due to Rouselakis and Waters [96] and enhance it
with novel, oblivious-translation capabilities, thus introducing a new type of encryption
scheme: attribute-based encryption with oblivious attribute translation (OTABE).
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Further information about ABE can be found in [17, 47].

1.2.2

Bayesian networks

A Bayesian network (BN) is a directed graphical model that captures a subset of the independence relations of a given joint probability distribution. Each BN is represented as
a directed acyclic graph (DAG), where nodes in the graph represent random variables and
edges represent statistical dependencies between variables. Specifically, a key property
of BNs is that each variable is conditionally independent of its non-descendants, given its
parents in the network. The parameters of a BN are all of the nodes’ conditional probability distributions, which are often represented as tables (cpts). Cpts quantify the effects of
the node’s parents on each of the nodes’ states.
The main objective of a BN is to model the posterior conditional probability distribution of a variable or a set of variables of interest after observing new data (“evidence”).
BNs may be constructed either manually, using knowledge of the underlying domain (e.g.
“priors”), or automatically using domain-specific datasets.
In Chapters 3 and 4, we exploit some of the main advantages of BNs for the purpose
of inferring different behavioral intentions of SN users. BNs are highly suitable for this
purpose, because they naturally encode relations between different variables, rather than
focusing solely on relations between features and the target variable. This property is
essential when dealing with SN data or, more generally, with a data set that contains many
correlations among features. Furthermore, BNs allow us to incorporate prior information
in parameters and to learn parameters from both data and priors.
Further information about BNs can be found in [54, 63].
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1.2.3

Dynamic Bayesian networks

BNs are static models and cannot represent dynamic processes. A dynamic Bayesian network (DBN) is a sequence of BNs that adds three components: temporal variables, temporal edges, and temporal evidence. The ith BN in the sequence represents the ith time slice
of the DBN. In order to build a DBN, one must specify both its intra-slice structure and
corresponding cpts and its inter-slice cpts. Intra-slice cpts represent dependency relations
within a single time slice. Inter-slice cpts represent temporal dependency relations, i.e.,
relations between variables from different time slices.
DBNs can model temporal relations between different variables and thus are capable
of capturing influences over time; this makes them excellent tools for modeling timevarying dependencies. Furthermore, DBNs are more versatile than BNs in terms of the
queries that they support and can be used to conduct richer types of analysis. These types
include inference of one or more variables of interest, prediction of future states of one or
more variables, identification of key determinants of different variables in the network, and
backward reasoning and retroactive analysis of historical values of variables. By enabling
the analyst to assess how a given variable changes over time, DBNs provide a capability
that static BNs cannot.
In Chapter 4, we present a new conceptual model of SN users that is based on DBNs.
We go on to develop a new methodology for inference of dynamic attributes in SN settings.
We demonstrate the usefulness of this conceptual representation on five dynamic attributes,
each of which is a different behavioral intention.
Further information about DBNs can be found in [84].
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Chapter 2
Privacy-preserving data sharing
2.1

Introduction

As the amount, complexity, and value of data available in both private and public sectors
has risen sharply, data management and access control have challenged many organizations. Even more challenging are management and access control in interorganizational
data sharing. Each organization would like to minimize the amount of sensitive information disclosed to other organizations, including both information about the data and
information about the organization’s work methodologies and role structure.

2.1.1

Problem description

We consider scenarios in which multiple organizations need to share data while each organization uses its own set of proprietary metadata to describe the shared data. In these
scenarios, data records contain a payload, which is the actual data, and a set of metadata attributes that describe the payload. Although organizations may agree to share the
payload, each uses a different set of metadata attributes, taken from its own professional
domain, to describe this payload. Data must be shared in a controlled manner that protects
the confidentiality of each organization’s proprietary attributes and prevents unauthorized
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users from accessing the payload.
Typically, one organization, the data owner, maintains a set of data records that are
potentially useful to other organizations, called the data clients. Each data record contains
sensitive information about an individual, the data subject. Data users, who are employees of a data client, may need access to data records stored by the data owner to perform
their assigned tasks. Each user must have the proper authorization to access the payloads
of the specific set of records needed for a given task. Our framework also features a third
type of organization, data intermediaries, that enrich data with additional information that
is needed for the client’s tasks but is available only to the intermediary. Each organization
ORGi maintains its own vocabulary V OCi that contains the overall set of domain-specific,
intraorganizational attributes used in its operations. V OCi includes both proprietary, sensitive attributes and attributes that can be shared with other organizations. ORGi uses a
different set of attributes, AT Ti,j ⊆ V OCi , to describe each shared payload pj .
For example, the data owner may be an email service provider (ESP). The data records
represent email messages. Each email record is composed of a payload, which is the
content of the email message, and metadata attributes about the payload such as sender,
receiver, and date. Some attributes, e.g., the email message’s receiver, are sensitive; therefore, the ESP will share them with other organizations only when required to do so and
only in a controlled manner. Each email message is created by one of the ESP’s customers,
who are the data subjects; it is then stored and cataloged using attributes that represent
the message’s metadata as collected by the ESP. Clients may be law-enforcement (LE)
agencies, in which agents (data users) need access to email records in order to perform
investigations. Intermediaries may include government agencies such as the IRS, which
could provide tax records associated with the email addresses that appear in the messages’
metadata attributes.
Design goals: Each organization wishes to maintain its proprietary view of the shared data
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and to keep that view confidential. This means that the set AT Ti,j of attributes that ORGi
maintains on each shared payload must be hidden from the other organizations.
Another requirement that must be accommodated is the use of multiple vocabularies.
The owner uses vocabulary V OC1 to store and query the shared data, an intermediary
uses a different vocabulary V OC2 to enrich the shared data, and the client uses a third
vocabulary V OC3 to query and process the data, to manage access control, and to issue
data-access authorizations to its employees. Therefore, our framework must provide a
mechanism that dynamically and obliviously transforms attributes of shared data from one
vocabulary to another. Note that that this problem cannot be solved simply by requiring any set of organizations that may need to share data to agree on a shared, standard
vocabulary. Such a standardization effort would require the organizations to know both
the names and values of attributes used by other organizations. However, our premise is
that the values of many attributes used internally by organizations are sensitive and cannot
be exposed to other organizations. Furthermore, in many natural use cases (see Subsection 2.2.2), transformations require auxiliary information, such as up to date statistics or
lists. Such information is known only at the point at which a user requests a specific data
record and may need to be supplied by an intermediary that is not known by the data owner
at the time that the owner encrypts the data.
Finally, because attributes could reveal sensitive aspects of organizations’ activities,
regulators and data subjects should expect sharing of both payloads and attributes to be
kept to a minimum. To facilitate minimal exposure of sensitive information, an interorganizational data-sharing framework should offer a data-centric access-control mechanism.
Such a mechanism will allow a user to access a payload only if it is essential for the completion of one of her tasks; in addition, it will allow the user to learn only the subset of that
payload’s attributes that are needed for the task.
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2.1.2

Starting point: attribute-based encryption

Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a natural starting point in the design of our framework. In our terminology, the encryptor is the data owner, users are data clients’ employees (data users), and trusted authorities (TAs) both inside and outside the data client
determine users’ access policies. An ABE scheme grants an individual user a key that permits him to decrypt a ciphertext if and only if the key matches certain attributes specified
during the ciphertext’s creation. ABE enables fine-grained access control, which is essential in a privacy-preserving data-sharing framework. It provides one-to-many encryption,
which can significantly increase the scalability of encryption and key management – properties that are necessary for interorganizational data sharing. ABE policy-access formulae
are highly expressive, because they can be specified with binary or multivalued attributes,
using AND, OR, and threshold gates.
Existing ABE schemes, however, have several properties that make them unsuitable
for our framework.
In existing ABE schemes, encryptors, users, and TAs all use the same vocabulary.
This means that these schemes cannot be used off-the-shelf in our framework, where a
crucial element of the problem description is that participating organizations may belong
to different business sectors or professional domains and thus use different vocabularies.
In particular, a data client’s TAs and employees use a different vocabulary from that of the
data owner. In ABE terms, this implies that attributes used in access policies (and keys)
issued by the TAs to data users might belong to a different vocabulary from the one used
by the owner to encrypt and store ciphertexts. Unless a suitable transformation is made
between the keys and the ciphertexts, decryption will fail even if the ciphertext satisfies the
user’s access policy. Such a transformation must separately consider each attribute in the
ciphertext and change it into a valid attribute from the users’ keys’ vocabulary. To protect
both data subjects’ privacy and organizations’ proprietary views, the original attribute must
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remain hidden from the user and the new attribute must remain hidden from the encryptor.
Existing ABE schemes cannot support this requirement.
Moreover, existing ABE schemes are generally used for role-based access control and
thus have user-centric vocabularies (attributes that describe decryptors’ traits) that reflect
organizational structure and roles. The use of user-centric attributes, coupled with the
single-vocabulary assumption, implies that the encryptor (data owner) must be exposed to
the roles of potential decryptors (clients’ data users) and the organizational structure that
they fit into. Many organizations are reluctant to share such sensitive information.

2.1.3

Main contributions

We present a new system architecture and a suite of protocols for interorganizational
data sharing that support privacy of both data (payload hiding) and organizational vocabularies (attribute hiding). We introduce Attribute-Based Encryption With Oblivious
Attribute Translation (OTABE), in which a semi-trusted proxy translates the attributes under which a data record’s payload was encrypted into the attributes under which it can
be decrypted by authorized users. The proxy performs the translation without learning
the underlying plaintext data. Moreover, translation is oblivious in the sense that the attributes under which the record is encrypted remain hidden from the proxy. This novel
cryptographic technique enables mutually untrusted parties not only to use different vocabularies of attributes to describe the shared data but also to share proprietary metadata
attributes in a controlled manner that protects the attributes’ confidentiality (attribute privacy). Furthermore, attributes and policies can be dynamically reconfigured, in the sense
that updates are done dynamically, without the need for re-encryption, and offline. No
previous proposed ABE scheme achieves all of these properties.
We provide a concrete OTABE scheme and prove it selectively secure in the standard
model. We then use it in our design of an efficient, expressive, and flexible interorgani-
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zational data-sharing framework that we call PRShare. In addition to the direct benefits
of OTABE described above, PRShare provides several other capabilities that are desirable
in real-world interorganizational data-sharing applications, including efficient and direct
revocation, protection from key-abuse attacks, and hidden access policies. In order to obtain these features, we leverage our OTABE scheme’s translation technique. OTABE also
enables division of trust (multiple independent authorities authorize data access) and data
centricity (access policies contain data-related, rather than user-related, attributes), both of
which enhance privacy protection in PRShare. Finally, because of the unique structure of
OTABE ciphertexts, a single owner’s database can serve multiple clients without knowing the clients’ identities at encryption time. Furthermore, the owner does not to need to
authorize or serve clients’ data-access queries. Previous ABE schemes achieved some of
these desirable properties of our OTABE construction, but none achieved all of them.
Before proceeding to our technical results, we note that our approach is not suitable
for all data-sharing applications. For example, it is not intended for scenarios in which
the data subject participates directly in the user’s request for data about her and could be
asked to grant explicit consent. In general, data subjects in the scenarios we consider will
not even be aware of the specific uses that are made of data about them. Similarly, our
approach is not intended for scenarios in which there are clear, efficiently decidable, and
universal rules that govern which users can access which portions of the data; existing
access-control mechanisms suffice in such scenarios. Our techniques are useful in scenarios in which there are legally mandated, general principles that govern access to sensitive
data, but instantiating those principles in the form of efficiently decidable rules requires
data-specific and dynamically changing knowledge. We give two examples in Subsection 2.2.2.
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Table 2.1: Properties of Proxy-Assisted ABE Schemes
Scheme Type MA
[50] KP-ABE 7

Access
policy
LSSS

DAT
Proxy’s role
7
Outsourced decryption
Delegation of
[73] CP-ABE 7 AND gates 7
decryption rights
[116] KP-ABE 7
LSSS
7 Revocation management
[104] KP-ABE 7
LSSS
7 Revocation management
[117] CP-ABE 7 AND gates 7 Revocation management
[15] CP-ABE 3
LSSS
7
Outsourced decryption
Delegation of
[72] CP-ABE 7
LSSS
7
decryption rights
Outsourced decryption,
[70] CP-ABE 7 AND gates 7
encryption
[67] CP-ABE 7
LSSS
7
Outsourced decryption
OTABE KP-ABE 3
LSSS
3
Attribute translation

2.2
2.2.1

DR SM HP
7 RCCA 7
7 SCPA
7 SCPA
3 SCPA
7 SCCA
7 SRCPA

7
7
7
7
3

7

SCCA

7

7
7
3

SCPA
SCPA
SCPA

7
7
3

Background and motivation
Related work

Existing privacy-preserving data-sharing schemes fall into two general categories: centralized and decentralized. The former category includes the works of Dong et al. [32],
X. Liu et al. [76], Popa et al. [91] and Vinayagamurthy et al. [109]. The major advantage
of the centralized approach is efficiency; disadvantages include single points of failure and
the lack of division of trust. Decentralized solutions can be found in the work of Fabian
et al. [35], Froelicher et al. [41], C. Liu et al. [75], and Nayak et al. [86]. Decentralized
solutions avoid single points of failure, but they often have limited efficiency or scalability.
The original motivation for PRShare was enhancement of privacy protections in surveillance processes. Previous work in this area includes that of Kamara [62] and Kroll et
al. [66]; they proposed cryptographic protocols that protect the privacy of known surveillance targets. Segal et al. [101, 102] focused on unknown (i.e., not yet identified) targets
and provided cryptographic protocols that protect privacy of innocent bystanders in two
15

commonly used surveillance operations: set intersection and contact chaining. Frankle et
al. [40] used secure, multiparty computation and zero-knowledge protocols to improve the
accountability of electronic surveillance.
Attribute-based encryption was introduced by Sahai and Waters [99]. Their work was
followed by many ciphertext-policy ABE and key-policy ABE constructions, including
those in [11, 17, 47, 88, 96]. Chase [25] introduced multi-authority ABE, and Nishide
et al. [87] introduced ABE with hidden access policy. ABE has been applied in a wide
range of domains, including fine-grained data-access control in cloud environments [112],
health IT [5, 71], and security of blockchains and Internet-Of-Things devices [93, 115].
We now give a high-level explanation of some crucial differences between the role of
proxies in OTABE and their roles in previous works.
An OTABE scheme provides an algorithm T ranslate() which allows a semi-trusted
proxy to translate one or more of the attributes under which a data record’s payload is
encrypted without learning the underlying plaintext. Moreover, translation can be done
obliviously, in the sense that the attributes under which the payload is encrypted remain
hidden from the proxy who translates them. The proxy learns only the attributes’ new
values.
Two common responsibilities of proxies in ABE are outsourced decryption, which
was introduced by Green et al. [50], and revocation management, which was used by Yu et
al. [116, 117]. In both cases, proxies are used for efficiency; they assume much of the computational cost of decryption or revocation and lighten other parties’ loads. The attributetranslation protocols in OTABE are not designed to reduce the client’s or the owner’s
computational loads. Similarly, outsourced-decryption and revocation-management proxies are not designed to enable oblivious translation between organizational vocabularies or
to support dynamically reconfigurable attributes – two of OTABE’s primary goals. Simply put, proxies used for outsourced decryption and revocation management and those in
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OTABE serve completely different primary purposes.1
The use of proxies for ciphertext delegation was introduced by Sahai et al. [98]. Proxies in this scenario take ciphertexts that are decryptable under policy P1 and transform
them into ciphertexts that are decryptable under policy P2 . However, P2 must be stricter
than and use the same vocabulary as P1 ; here, “stricter” means than P2 permits the decryption of a subset of the ciphertexts that could be decrypted under the original policy P1
used by the encryptor. Neither of these restrictions applies to the proxies in OTABE.
In attribute-based proxy re-encryption (ABPRE), which was introduced by Liang et
al. [73], a proxy re-encrypts a ciphertext encrypted under access structure AS1 to one that
can be decrypted under access structure AS2 without learning the plaintext. There is a surface similarity between ABPRE and OTABE in that proxies in both transform ciphertexts
encrypted by data owners under AS1 into ciphertexts decryptable by clients under AS2 .
However, the entity that issues re-encryption keys to proxies in ABPRE requires knowledge of the vocabularies of both owner and client; to create re-encryption keys, she must
know AS1 and AS2 . Thus, unlike OTABE, ABPRE does not support multiple vocabularies
and can not provide attribute privacy.
In an ABPRE scheme, re-encryption keys are issued to a proxy on a per-access-policy
basis. In order to perform re-encryption, the entire access policy must be changed so that
the new policy contains no attributes that appear in the original policy. Neither of these
restrictions applies to OTABE, in which re-encryption-key issuing and re-encryption itself
can be done on a per-attribute basis. The responsibility for determining the new attribute
set and performing the re-encryption is divided among multiple parties from different trust
domains. Each party performs a partial re-encryption that uses only the attributes that
belong to its trust domain and does so in a controlled manner that results in a final, full
re-encryption that satisfies the data owner’s requirements. This decentralized approach
1

A direct-revocation mechanism, partially managed by the proxy, is a natural byproduct of attribute
translation, as described in Subsection 2.4.2, but it is not the primary goal of OTABE.
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allows OTABE to support multiple vocabularies, provide attribute privacy, and enable dynamically reconfigurable translation policies that do not require re-initialization of the
system or re-encryption of records by the owner.
Finally, in ABPRE, the proxy must know the ciphertext’s original access policy in order
to perform the re-encryption. OTABE proxies, by contrast, perform oblivious translation
and re-encryption; they do not learn the original set of attributes or the original access
structure under which the plaintext was encrypted.
A detailed comparison between our scheme and other proxy-assisted ABE schemes is
shown in Table 4.2. MA denotes multi authority, DAT denotes dynamic attribute translation, DR denotes direct revocation, SM denotes security model, HP denotes hidden policy.
In addition, SCCA,SCPA and SRCPA stand for selective CCA, CPA and RCPA, respectively.

2.2.2

Use cases

In order to motivate the notion of OTABE and illustrate its applicability in real-world
scenarios, we provide two examples.
Law-enforcement agencies: The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) [33]
was passed to protect the privacy rights of ISPs’ customers with respect to disclosure of
their personal information. The ECPA limits LE access to email and other communication
records in a manner that is consistent with the Fourth Amendment. However, it has several
“loopholes.” For example, the ECPA classifies an email message that is stored on a third
party’s server for more than 180 days as “abandoned.” As a result, LE agencies can request
that both the metadata and the content of those email messages be turned over without the
need for judicial review.
Unrestrained government access to communication data is clearly undesirable. However, given national-security and public-health concerns, expecting LE and intelligence
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agencies never to access any data held by communication companies such as ESPs is unrealistic. A more realistic goal is to deploy a policy that restricts such data sharing to
the minimum needed in order to perform the task at hand, as defined by multiple trusted
entities. OTABE provides a mechanism that can enforce such policies and protect the confidential information of all organizations and agencies that participate in the data-sharing
protocols.
In OTABE terms, the data owner is the ESP, and the data subjects are people who
send and receive email messages. The data are email records. Each email record contains
a payload, which is the content of an email message, encrypted under a set of metadata
attributes, e.g., sender’s and receiver’s email addresses, date, subject line, etc. The client
is an LE agency, such as the FBI or a municipal police department, and the intermediaries
may be other LE agencies, non-LE government agencies, or private companies. The data
users are LE agents employed by the client.
Clearly, email records can be useful to LE agencies, but an agent should be able to
decrypt only those records whose metadata attributes constitute probable cause in the
context of a specific investigation. The entities who determine probable cause on a perinvestigation basis are the TAs. Each TA is motivated by a different set of interests and
goals. A TA may be part of the judicial branch, the ESP, the LE agency, or another external
entity.
Not all of the attributes used by the ESP to store email records can be shared with
the LE agency, because some of them reveal both private information about the ESP’s
customers or proprietary information of the ESP itself. Similarly, the attributes used by the
LE agency to access and process records and to issue access policies cannot be shared with
the ESP, because they reveal confidential information about the LE agency’s investigations.
Furthermore, some of the attributes that are used by the parties do not belong to the same
vocabulary. For instance, the attribute “appears-in-watchlist” is frequently used in keys
issued to LE agents, but it is meaningless to the ESP. Such attributes must undergo dynamic
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adaptation to ensure that agents’ keys match an email message’s attributes. OTABE allows
the ESP and LE agency to use their own vocabularies while keeping the email messages’
content and metadata confidential.
TAs are likely to grant an agent who is investigating a crime access to email records
in which either the sender or the receiver is on the agency’s watchlist. The LE agency’s
proxy can translate the ESP’s sender and receiver attributes into the LE agency’s “onwatchlist” attribute in an oblivious fashion, thus maintaining both the confidentiality of
the watchlist and the privacy of data subjects’ email addresses. In addition, an agent might
want to check whether the sender or receiver appears on other agencies’ lists, e.g., a list of
investigations ongoing at LEA-2, which is another LE agency. Because details of LEA-2’s
ongoing investigations cannot be shared with the client, the translation of the attributes
sender and receiver will be done obligiously by LEA-2’s intermediary proxy.
Similarly, the access policy of an agent who is investigating cyber fraud may enable
access to email records in which the subject line matches a “suspicious” pattern. The
definition of “suspicious” may be determined according to a dynamically updated list of
keywords. Using this keyword list, the client’s proxy can obliviously translate the attribute
“subject line,” maintained by the ESP, into the attribute “is-suspicious-subject,” maintained
by the client and used in the agent’s access policy. Neither the agent nor the proxy is able
to read the actual subject line, and the data subject’s privacy is maintained.
Note that, in both of these investigations, dynamic translations are needed, because
watchlists and lists of suspicious keywords change over time. They enforce the requirement that an agent cannot access payloads without probable cause, but they do not reveal
to the ESP confidential information about watchlists and ongoing investigations.
Insurance companies: Consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) collect and share creditrelated information about consumers. This information is used by credit-card issuers, mortgage lenders, insurance companies, etc. to assess creditworthiness of consumers. The three

20

Table 2.2: Summary of notations and symbols
Notation
(M )S
[x]y
ORGS
DECS
Porgj
Sm
Sim
Sp
pubΠ (x)
Kx
org(k)
Ej (L)
F (K, x)
F (x)[0]

Description
encryption of M under a set of attributes S
encryption of x under the key y
set of proxies involved in translation of C = (M )S
set of parties involved in decryption of C = (M )S
the proxy operating on behalf of organization orgj
mutable attributes
immutable attributes
the set of attributes’ labels that Porgp is allowed to translate
the public key of entity x, created by a public-key scheme Π
a symmetric shared key between orgowner and organization orgx
the organization who is allowed to translate attribute attk
encryption of auxiliary information L by organization orgj
pseudorandom function keyed with symmetric key K
the first argument of the output of the evaluation of F on x

largest CRAs in the US are Experian, TransUnion, and Equifax.2 The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) [36] regulates the collection, dissemination, and use of credit-related information. The FCRA gives companies the right to access consumers’ credit reports. This
access is not limited to reports on the company’s customers; it may include reports on
large sets of potential customers. In order to create pre-screened offers and market them
to potential customers, an insurance company is allowed to access consumers’ credit reports and to share information with credit-card issuers, banks, other insurance companies,
etc. However, access rights to credit reports are limited by the FCRA to information for
which an insurance company has a permissible purpose. OTABE can be used to formalize and enforce this vague concept in a manner that protects both consumers’ privacy and
proprietary information of insurance companies and CRAs.
In OTABE terms, the data owner is a CRA, and the data subjects are consumers. Data
records are credit reports, owned by the CRA. Each record is encrypted under the set of
attributes that describe the report, e.g., the phone number, credit score, and driver’s license
2

In September of 2017, Equifax announced a data breach that exposed the personal information of 147
million people and cost the company hundreds of millions of dollars in compensation to affected people [16,
37].
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number (DLN) of the data subject, credit-utilization ratio, date and time of the report’s
creation, CRA-internal statistics, etc.
Insurance companies are the data clients. Data users are insurance-company employees who use credit reports to make decisions about which insurance products to offer
consumers and how to price them. In order to comply with the FCRA’s “permissiblepurpose” requirement, employees should only access credit reports on a “need-to-know”
basis. An employee can only access those records whose associated attributes are relevant
to her task, as determined by a set of TAs. TAs may include the CRA, a government entity,
or various parties within the insurance company. Other organizations, such as credit-card
issuers, government entities, banks, and other insurance companies may serve as intermediaries by “enriching” data supplied by a CRA in a privacy-preserving manner.
As in the LE scenario, each organization wants to protect the confidentiality of its
proprietary information. For instance, the CRA does not want to reveal unnecessary identifying information about its customers, an insurance company does not want to reveal how
it makes business decisions regarding which consumers are considered “qualified” for prescreened offers, etc. Also as in LE, different organizations may use different vocabularies.
Consider the attribute “number of accidents,” which is used by insurance companies to
screen potential customers. This attribute cannot be used by CRAs, because they do not
maintain such information in their credit reports. OTABE supports all of these requirements.
Assume that each report is encrypted under the following attributes:
CREDIT-UTILIZATION-RATIO, CREDIT-SCORE, PHONE-NUMBER, DLN, and DATE.
Employee U in the car-insurance department is assigned the task of finding qualified potential customers and tailoring pre-screened car-insurance offers, using information found
in their credit reports.
The TAs determine that, for this task, a qualified customer is defined by the following
policy:
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CREDIT-SCORE ≥ X ∧ #ACCIDENTS ≤ Y ∧ IS-BLACKLISTED=FALSE ∧ ISCREDIT-RATIO-LESS-THAN-AVERAGE=TRUE
The intermediaries in this case are financial business partners of the insurance company, e.g., banks and credit-card issuers, and the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV).
To complete her task, U submits to the CRA a query that requests the reports of all
consumers whose credit scores are greater than X. The CRA then sends each matching
record to two intermediaries: the DMV and a credit-card issuer.
For each record, the DMV’s proxy obliviously translates the DLN attribute into #ACCIDENTS, which is found in the subject’s driving record. The credit-card issuer’s proxy
obliviously translates the numeric CREDIT-UTILIZATION-RATIO attribute into a binary
attribute IS-CREDIT-RATIO-LESS-THAN-AVERAGE by obliviously comparing the consumer’s utilization ratio with the average utilization ratio of the issuer’s customers. The
insurance company’s proxy obliviously translates the PHONE-NUMBER attribute into the
attribute IS-BLACKLISTED, using a dynamically updated list of individuals who were
blacklisted by the insurance company or one of its business associates for, e.g., failure to
pay.
When U receives a record, she will be able to decrypt the credit report, read its contents, and learn the subjects’ identifying information if and only if the record’s posttranslation attributes satisfy her access policy.
Data privacy is achieved, because only authorized users can decrypt a given credit
report. Attribute privacy is achieved, because attributes used by each organization remain
hidden to the extent required. Moreover, sensitive information about consumers whose
records are decrypted is also protected. For example, a user may learn that a consumer’s
number of accidents is below a certain threshold but not learn the exact number. Finally,
these translations demonstrate OTABE proxies’ ability to translate dynamically, because
the list and the average change over time, and obliviously, because neither the attributes
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nor the data are revealed to them.

2.3

Attribute-based encryption with oblivious attribute
translation

2.3.1

Terminology

Attributes: Our scheme uses multi-valued attributes, denoted by hlabel, operator, valuei.
Note that this representation is different from the ones found in typical ABE schemes,
which use “descriptive” (essentially binary) attributes. We denote by attLk and attVk the
label and value of an attribute attk . Translation of an attribute can be done either by
changing the attribute’s value (i.e., replacing value with value∗ ) or by replacing both the
attribute’s label and its value with label∗ and value∗ , respectively.
In PRShare, attributes’ labels are partitioned into two sets: mutable, denoted Sm , and
immutable, denoted Sim . Immutable attributes are ones that cannot be translated by any
party in the system. Intuitively, they are the attributes that are shared by the owner and
the client. Mutable attributes, on the other hand, are ones that can be translated by a
semi-trusted proxy at some point after their initialization by the owner.
Hidden access policy: We introduce an OTABE scheme with hidden access policy by
ensuring that the set of attributes used to encrypt a message is hidden from the CSP, the
proxies, and the data users. We use the term “hidden access policy” for compatibility with
the terminology used in existing CP-ABE work, in which access policies are attached to
the ciphertexts.
In such a scenario, a data user cannot learn the attributes that are attached to a ciphertext but is able to determine which attributes are needed to perform the decryption. The
hidden-access-policy feature is used to enhance privacy. However, if the owner and client
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wish to reveal the ciphertexts’ attributes to the users or wish to speed up decryption at the
expense of some privacy, they can turn off this feature without having to alter the encryption, translation, and decryption operations. This follows from the modular design of the
system, as discussed in Subsection. 2.5.1. Note that the hidden-access-policy feature does
not enable the creation of trivial policies (i.e., those that always allow a user to decrypt
every record she receives). This is because a key must satisfy all TAs’ policies in order to
succeed in decrypting, and the data owner can always serve as a TA or delegate to a TA
that it trusts not to permit decryptions that it wishes to forbid.
In general, PRShare is designed to achieve a high level of privacy while allowing flexible and expressive data-sharing protocols. In real-world scenarios, however, organizations
have different priorities. Some may favor privacy, but others may favor functionality and
thus prefer to allow their data users broader access to information about the shared data at
the expense of privacy. PRShare is able to support both approaches: It is highly modular,
and each privacy guarantee relies on a different low-level feature that can be removed or
changed to fit the organization’s privacy-functionality trade-offs while maintaining the rest
of the privacy guarantees.
(Informal) Definition: Let M be a data record’s payload encrypted under a set S ⊆ U1
of attributes, resulting in a ciphertext C. We refer to the set S as the set of original attributes
under which M is encrypted. Let T : U1 → U2 be a translation function from the universe
U1 of attributes to the universe U2 of attributes, and let Qj be the set of original attributes
that a semi-trusted proxy j is allowed to translate. An ABE scheme supports oblivious
attribute translation by semi-trusted proxy j if, given C, Qj , and T , for all s ∈ Qj , the
proxy is able to compute T (s) without:
• learning anything about M ,
• learning anything about the attributes in S \ Qj , or
• learning the labels or the values of attributes in S ∩ Qj .
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Formal security definitions are given in Subsection 2.5.2.

2.3.2

Algorithms

An MA-OTABE scheme consists of the following algorithms:
GlobalSetup(λ) ⇒ (P K): The global-setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs global parameters P K.
AuthoritySetup(P K) ⇒ (P Ki , M SKi ): Each authority runs the authority-setup algorithm with P K as input to produce its own public key P Ki and master secret key
M SKi .
Encrypt(M, P K, S, {P Ki }i∈Aut ) ⇒ (CT ): The encryption algorithm takes as input
a message M , a set S of attributes, and the public parameters. It outputs the ciphertext
CT .
KeyGen(P K, M SKi , Ai , u, t) ⇒ (SKi,u,t ): The key-generation algorithm takes as
input the global parameters, an access structure Ai , a master secret key M SKi , the global
identifier u of a data user who issued the key-generation request, and a task t. It outputs a
decryption key SKi,u,t .
Distribute(I) ⇒ ({C j |j ∈ DECS }): This algorithm takes as input a set I of ciphertexts’ ids. It outputs a set of partial ciphertexts, {C j |j ∈ DECS }.
Translate(P K, j = p, C p , {P Ki }i∈Aut ) ⇒ (C 0p ): The translation algorithm takes as
input the global public parameters and the authorities’ public parameters, a proxy’s index
j = p, and a partial ciphertext C p . It outputs a translated partial ciphertext C 0p .
Decrypt(P K, {SKi,u,t }, C u , {C 0j |j ∈ ORGS }) ⇒ (M ): The decryption algorithm
takes as input the global parameters, a set of secret keys {SKi,u,t }i∈Aut , a partial ciphertext
C u , and a set of translated partial ciphertexts {C 0j |j ∈ ORGS }. It outputs the plaintext
M.
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2.4

System model

Definition of attributes: We define two sets of attributes’ labels: Sowner represents the
set of attributes that the owner uses to encrypt, store, and access data records that it owns.
This set is determined by the data owner. Sclient represents the set of attributes under which
keys are generated; those are the attributes that the client uses to access and process the
shared data records, and they are chosen by orgclient . Note that Sowner ∩ Sclient 6= ∅; this
means that some attributes are shared by the client and the owner. This enables the users
to retrieve data records of potential interest from the CSP using queries that are composed
of shared attributes and also enables the data owner, if it wishes, to be one of the TAs. We
denote the universes of attributes comprising each set by Uowner and Uclient .
For each data intermediary orgj in the system, we define a set of attributes’ labels
Sj ⊆ Sm . It represents the set of attributes that is governed by orgj and hence can be
translated by the proxy Porgj that acts on behalf of orgj .

2.4.1

System participants

Data owner: orgowner is responsible for encrypting each of its data records using the set
S ⊆ Uowner of attributes that are most likely to appear in future queries.
Data users: Data users are employees of orgclient who need access to data records stored
by orgowner in order to perform daily tasks. Each user is assigned a unique global identifier
and a list of tasks. Each task t has a well defined time limit tlt . The list is dynamic in the
sense that tasks can be removed or added to it during the system run. A user issues two
types of queries. A key request is used to obtain a key that corresponds to a specific access
policy. A data query is used to obtain data records owned by orgowner that are relevant to
a specific task in the user’s task list.
Cloud-service provider: The CSP stores the ciphertexts outsourced by orgowner and re-
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sponds to queries submitted by data users in orgclient .
Trusted authorities: TAs are the entities that determine the decryption policy of orgclient
and issue secret keys that are used by data users. They use attributes from Uclient . There
must be at least two TAs, and they may be entities in orgowner , orgclient , or external organization. We assume that at least one TA belongs to orgclient and that at least one TA does
not.
Proxies: Each proxy Porgj represents a different organization orgj (either an intermediary
or a client) and operates on behalf of that organization. The role of a proxy Porgj is to
translate a subset of attributes in Uowner under which a ciphertext was encrypted to the
corresponding attributes in Uclient . To do this, the proxy uses both a generic translation
algorithm that is used by all proxies in the system and an organization-specific translation
function that is determined by orgj and may involve auxiliary information provided by the
organization to its proxy. The generic translation algorithm is public, but the organizationspecific translation function and auxiliary information are considered private to orgj and
Porgj . We assume that every MA-OTABE scheme includes at least one proxy (the “client
proxy”) that is responsible for managing orgclient ’s user-level revocation mechanism and
for performing vocabulary translations.
Data subjects: Each data record owned by orgowner is linked to a certain individual, the
data subject. A data record’s payload contains personal information about the data subject,
including content produced by the data subject. We assume that every data subject has a
user id (UID) that varies based on the type of data used in the system. Examples of UIDs
include phone numbers and email addresses.

2.4.2

Revocation mechanism

One major byproduct of OTABE is the ability to implement an efficient and direct revocation mechanism, in which revoking the keys of a set U of users does not affect the
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keys of users not in U . Using the translation technique, a semi-trusted mediator can transform a ciphertext that was encrypted under a set of data-centric attributes at point A into
a “personalized” ciphertext reflecting a specific data query made by a user at point B. The
main idea of our revocation mechanism is the addition of global-identifier (GID) and time
attributes to each key. In addition, we add a dummy GID and dummy times during encryption. These dummy attributes will be translated to suit the specific data query’s time and
requester only if a certain criterion is met. This creates an efficient mechanism in which
most revocations are enforced automatically.
We assume that every data user receives a unique GID. The data client maintains a
revocation list that contains revoked GIDs. Users whose GIDs are on the revocation list
are not allowed to access any data record. Revocation-list updates are infrequent and
happen only when a user completely leaves the organization. Furthermore, GIDs can
be removed from the revocation list after a relatively short time, because the key-level
revocation mechanism ensures that secret keys become invalid within a well known and
controlled length of time from the date they were issued.
For the key-level revocation mechanism, we leverage a basic trait of an organizational
task: It has a well defined time limit. This time limit is determined by the user’s manager
and may change while the user is working the task. In our case, the entities who choose the
time limit are the TAs; this is an integral part of the per-task “probable-cause” approach.
The time limit given to a specific task performed by a user becomes an attribute in the
user’s key. In addition, the encryptor adds to each ciphertext a dummy “time” attribute.
That dummy attribute is translated by the client proxy to the current time at which the data
query is submitted by the user, thus making a key-level revocation check an automatic part
of any decryption attempt. In our construction, we view a “time limit” as a date. This can
easily be extended to include finer-grained notions of time.
We also leverage our attribute-translation technique for the user-level revocation mechanism. It enables us to include a user-specific component in the ciphertext; this component
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is adjusted according to the specific data user by the client proxy in the data-retrieval phase.
Note that we treat the GID as an additional attribute. We incorporate the user’s GID as
an attribute in the user’s secret keys and, in parallel, add a “placeholder” GID attribute to
each ciphertext. When a user submits a data query, the placeholder attribute is translated
to that specific user’s GID only if she does not appear in the revocation list. This mechanism provides an efficient user-level revocation mechanism and protects the scheme from
collusion attempts and key-abuse attacks.
Details of the translations used in our revocation mechanism are provided in Subsection 2.7.2.

2.4.3

Main flows

The system model consists of an encryption flow, a data flow, and a key-generation flow.
We assume that the system has already been set up, resulting in the global public parameters P K and a public-key, master-secret-key pair (P Ki , M SKi ) for each trusted authority
Auti .
Encryption flow: In order to encrypt a data record’s payload M , orgowner first determines
the set S of attributes under which M will be encrypted. S ⊆ Uowner is composed of
|S| − 2 data-centric attributes that describe the record’s metadata and two attributes that
serve as “placeholders.” The placeholders attGID and attT IM E are initialized with random, “dummy” values by orgowner and receive their actual values from orgclient ’s proxy.
Based on the attributes in S, the encryptor determines the set DECS of decryption parties. DECS contains all parties involved in the decryption of the ciphertext, i.e., a data
user and the set ORGS of organizations that are allowed to translate attributes in S (represented by their proxies). ORGS includes the client’s proxy and any number of data intermediaries’ proxies. After determining DECS , orgowner encrypts M under S by calling
Encrypt(M, P K, S, {P Ki }i∈Aut ) and receives a set {C j } of |DECS | partial ciphertexts.
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|DECS | − 1 of the partial ciphertexts correspond to proxies and contain only attribute
components. One corresponds to the data user and contains both attribute components
and a data component; the latter contains the payload M itself. Note that, for each C j ,
U (C j ) ⊆ Uowner , where U (C) is the vocabulary of attributes under which a ciphertext C
is encrypted. Lastly, orgowner computes Y = {Obf (attk ) | attk ∈ S}, a set of obfuscated
values for immutable attributes in S, and uploads to the cloud the preprocessed ciphertext
and the UID that the ciphertext is associated with.
Key-generation flow: A user u who belongs to orgclient sends a key request to the TAs in
each of the following cases: Either a new task is inserted to u’s task list, or the time limit
for an existing task in u’s task list has expired, and her existing secret key for that task
is no longer valid. The request contains a description of the task and the “ideal” access
policy that u would like to obtain in the context of that task. Each authority Auti creates
an access policy Ai based on an examination of the user’s request and the nature of the
specific task. It creates a GID attribute attGID that contains the user’s GID u. Finally, it
determines tlt , which is either a new time limit for t (if t is a new task) or an extended
time limit (if t is an existing task and its time limit has expired) and uses tlt to create a
time-limit attribute attLIM IT . The time-limit attribute that is embedded in a secret key
must be expressed using the same units (date, month, time stamp, etc.) used in the time
attribute attT IM E that is attached to the ciphertext. It then creates its secret key SKi,u,t by
calling KeyGen(P K, M SKi , A0i , u, t), where
A0i = Ai ∧ attGID ∧ attLIM IT = Ai ∧ (GID == u) ∧ (T IM E < tlt ).

Data flow: A data user u sends a data query to the CSP. It contains a conjunctive query
ψ on attributes from Uowner ∩ Uclient . The CSP retrieves the ciphertexts that satisfy the
query. For each ciphertext C, it sends C j=u to u and each C j=p to a proxy Porgp . At
that point, because u received only a partial ciphertext, she cannot yet use her key for
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decryption. Each proxy Porgp in ORGS translates each attribute attk such that (attk ∈
S) ∧ (attLk ∈ Sp ) by calling T ranslate(P K, j = p, C p , {P Ki }i∈Aut ) and computes an
obfuscated value for each new attribute attk0 that it added, creating Yp = {Obf (attk0 )}.
The client organization’s proxy also manages the user-level mechanism by performing a
correct translation of attGID and attT IM E only if u does not appear in the revocation list.
Each proxy Porgp then sends the translated partial ciphertext C 0j=p and Yp to the user. At
this point, U (C 0j ) has changed from Uowner to Uclient . Because each partial ciphertext
is, from the proxy’s view, independent of the data component inside the ciphertext, each
proxy is able to perform the translations without learning M . Moreover, the structure of
each partial ciphertext ensures that Porgj learns nothing about the attributes with labels that
do not belong to Sj . All attribute components that correspond to attributes that the proxy
can translate contain obfuscations of the attributes, rather than the attributes themselves;
thus, each attribute attk such that (attk ∈ S)∧(attLk ∈ Sp ) remains hidden from the proxy,
while the obfuscated value can still be used for various translation operations. The user
gathers all the translated partial ciphertexts {C 0j |j ∈ ORGS } and her partial ciphertext
C u to create an aggregated ciphertext that she can decrypt using her secret key. Finally,
u decrypts the payload by calling Decrypt(P K, {SKi,u,t }i∈Aut , C u , {C 0j |j ∈ ORGS }).
The decryption succeeds if and only if the following three conditions hold:
• ∀i ∈ Aut, T R(S) |= Ai , where T R(S) = Y ∪ {Yj }j∈ORGS represents the set of
translated attributes, created based on the original set S of attributes.
• tlt , the time limit for task t, has not expired. (Otherwise, attLIM IT cannot be
satisfied.)
• u has not been revoked, and no collusion or key-abuse attempt has been made.
(Otherwise, attGID cannot be satisfied.)
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2.5
2.5.1

Security definitions
Goals and trust relationships

An OTABE-based framework should satisfy three security goals with respect to all PPT
adversaries.
Selective security against chosen-plaintext attacks: The adversary cannot learn (in the
selective-security model) the plaintext of either an original ciphertext or an aggregated,
translated ciphertext.
Security against colluding parties: Let C = (M )S be a valid MA-OTABE ciphertext.
No coalition of at most |DECS | − 1 parties can learn anything about M .
Attribute secrecy: The trust model that we consider in this work is different from the
standard ABE trust model. Unlike the plaintext, for which we have a single security notion
that applies to all the participants, we cannot apply a uniform security criterion to the
attributes. Because each party plays a distinct role in the protocol, the set of attributes to
which it is allowed to be exposed differs from the sets to which other parties are allowed
to be exposed. We define three security requirements to ensure the secrecy of ciphertexts’
attributes: hidden access policy, oblivious translation, and attribute privacy.
Hidden access policy: The set of attributes used to encrypt a message cannot be learned
by the CSP, the proxies, or the data users.
Oblivious translation: The original attributes that each proxy Porgj translates remain hidden from the proxy. That is, for every attribute s such that sL ∈ Sj , the proxy Porgj is able
to translate s into a new attribute s0 ∈ Uclient without learning s.
Attribute privacy: Informally, the attribute-privacy requirement states that organizations
that share data must be able to maintain separate views of the data that they share.
Definition 1 Given a payload space M, a universe Uowner of attributes used by the encryptor (orgowner ) to describe data records it owns, and a universe Uclient of attributes
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used by orgclient for data usage and authorization management, we define a function
M AP : M × Uowner → Uclient that maps attributes in orgowner ’s vocabulary (corresponding to data records’ payloads M ∈ M) to attributes in orgclient ’s vocabulary. An OTABE
scheme achieves attribute privacy if and only if:
• For every data record’s payload M and every attribute s ∈ Uowner , if s is mutable,
the encryptor does not learn M AP (M, s), the translated value of the attribute s with
respect to M .
• For every data record’s payload M and every attribute v ∈ Uclient , if M AP −1 (M, v)
is mutable, data users and TAs do not learn M AP −1 (M, v), the original value of the
attribute v with respect to M .
The following observations about our threat model, which considers external adversaries as well as the parties presented in Subsection 2.4.1, are natural aspects of the security definitions and results presented in Subsection 2.5.2.
No organization fully trusts the other organizations: Our framework protects the owner’s
data records, attributes of the data held by each organization, and auxiliary information
held by each organization that is used for attribute translation. We assume that the owner
is honest but curious.
No organization fully trusts its proxy server: CSPs and proxies in our framework, which
we assume to be honest but curious, are only given encrypted attributes and encrypted
auxiliary information. Note that the use of honest but curious proxies is well established
in the design of cryptographic protocols [9, 18, 21, 49, 56, 117].
The client organization does not fully trust its data users: Data users in our system,
who are assumed to be malicious, can only access records that are relevant to their assigned
tasks, as determined by the TAs. We assume that at least one TA is honest. Data users also
cannot learn attributes of the shared data records that are held by organizations other than
the data client.
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2.5.2

Definitions

We start by presenting the definition of selective security for our MA-OTABE scheme.
Let E = (Setup, AuthoritySetup, Encrypt, Distribute, KeyGen, T ranslate, Decrypt)
be an OTABE scheme for a set of authorities Aut, |Aut| = K. Consider the following
OTABE game for a PPT adversary A, a challenger B, a security parameter λ, an attribute
universe Uowner , and an attribute universe Uclient .
Init: The adversary chooses the challenge attribute set S, where S ⊆ Uowner . Based
on S, the adversary chooses the challenge decryption-parties set DECS* , where DECS* ⊆
DECS . The adversary also chooses a subset of corrupted authorities Autc . We assume
that all authorities but one are corrupted and denote the honest authority by Auth ; thus,
Aut = Autc ∪ {Auth }. The adversary sends Autc , Auth , S, and DECS* to the challenger.
Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm to produce the public parameters P K
and, for each authority Auti , runs the AuthoritySetup algorithm to produce P Ki and
M SKi . If Auti is honest, the challenger sends P Ki to the adversary. If Auti is corrupted,
the challenger sends both P Ki and M SKi to the adversary.
Phase 1: The adversary chooses a revocation list RL and sends it to the challenger.
It may then issue any polynomial number of key requests for tuples of the form (access
structure, GID, task identifier) and send them to the challenger.
Given a request (access structure=AC ∈ Uclient , GID=u, task=t), the adversary proceeds as follows. For requests issued for a corrupted authority Auti , the adversary runs
SKiut = KeyGen(P K, M SKi , AC, u, t) itself, because it has M SKi , given to it in
the setup phase. For requests issued for the honest authority Auth , the challenger provides the answer. It extracts the time limit tlt from the description of task t and creates
a time-limit attribute attLIM IT = hDAT E, <, tlt i. In addition, given the GID, u, in the
request, the challenger creates a GID attribute attGID = hGID, ==, ui. It then creates
AC 0 = AC ∧ attLIM IT ∧ attGID , which is an updated version of AC, and performs:
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• If S |= AC 0 and u ∈
/ RL, the challenger aborts.
• If S |= AC 0 and u ∈ RL, then S must contain SGID = u. The challenger picks GID
u0 , u0 6= u, and generates the secret key using
SKhu0 t = KeyGen(P K, M SKh , AC, u0 , t).
• If S 6|= AC 0 , the challenger generates the secret key using
SKhut = KeyGen(P K, M SKh , AC, u, t).
Challenge: The adversary submits two messages m0 and m1 to the challenger. In addition, for every proxy j in DECS* , it sends a bit aj to the challenger. (By default, if j represents the user, we assume aj = 0.) The challenger flips a fair coin b and encrypts mb under
S: CT = Encrypt(mb , P K, S, {P Ki }i∈Aut ). Assuming ICT is the index corresponding
to the ciphertext CT , the challenger computes a set {C j |j ∈ DECS* } of partial ciphertexts
using Distribute(ICT ). For each proxy j ∈ DECS* , if aj = 1, the challenger performs a
translation of the corresponding partial ciphertext, C 0j = T ranslate(P K, j, C j , {P Ki }i∈Aut ),
resulting in a translated partial ciphertext C 0j . Finally, it sends the ciphertext C ∗ to the adversary:
C∗ =

[

c∗j

c∗j =

j∈DECS*




C 0j

if aj = 1



C j

if aj = 0

Phase 2: Phase 1 is repeated.
Guess: The adversary outputs a guess b0 of b. The advantage of the adversary in this
game is defined as Pr[b0 = b] − 0.5.

Definition 2 An MA-OTABE scheme is selectively secure if all PPT adversaries have
negligible advantage with respect to λ in the selective-security game.
In the proof that our MA-OTABE construction is secure, we use a q-type assumption about prime-order bilinear groups: the decisional q-Bilinear (t, n)-threshold Diffie36

Hellman assumption ((q, t, n)-DBTDH). It is similar to the Decisional q-Bilinear DiffieHellman assumption (q-DBDH) used by Rouselakis and Waters [96].3 . The (q, t, n)DBTDH assumption can be seen as a “threshold version” of the q-DBDH assumption:
Instead of sending the attacker terms that contain the element z (q-DBDH), z is broken
into n shares and some of the terms that the attacker receives contain only shares {zc }c∈V
of z, where V , |V | = t, is chosen by the attacker.
The assumption is parameterized by a security parameter λ, a suitably large prime p,
two prime-order bilinear groups G1 and G2, a bilinear map e : G1 → G2, and integers q,
t, and n, where n ≥ 1 is polynomial in λ, and t ≤ n. It is defined by a game between a
challenger and an attacker. The attacker chooses a subset V ⊆ [n] of t indices and sends
it to the challenger. The challenger picks a group element g uniformly at random from
G1, q + 3 exponents x, y, z, b1 , b2 , . . . , bq independently and uniformly at random from Zp ,
and n − 1 additional exponents z1 , . . . , zn−1 independently and uniformly at random from
P
Zp . It sets zn = z − n−1
c=1 zc . Then it sends (p, G1, G2, e) and the following terms to the
attacker:
2

g, g x , g y , g z , g (xz)
∀l ∈ [q] : g bl , g xzbl , g xz/bl , g x
2

2 zb

l

2

, g y/bl , g y

2

∀l, f ∈ [q], l 6= f : g ybl /bf , g xyzbl /bf , g (xz)

2 /b2
l

2 b /b
l f

, Ψl,f

where
Ψl,f = {g xzc (bl /bf ) |c ∈ V }.
The challenger flips a fair coin b. If b = 0, it gives the term e(g, g)xyz to the attacker.
Otherwise, it gives the attacker a term R chosen uniformly at random from G2. Finally,
the attacker outputs its guess b0 for the value of b.

3

For convenience, we give the details of the q-DBDH assumption in Section 2.10.
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Definition 3 We say that the (q, t, n)-DBTDH assumption holds if all PPT attackers have
at most a negligible advantage in λ in the above security game, where the advantage is
defined as Pr[b0 = b] − 1/2.

2.6

Construction overview

2.6.1

Main OTABE techniques

Before presenting our construction in full detail, we present a simplified version that is
inspired by the 69large-universe ABE scheme of Rouselakis and Waters [96] and that
illustrates basic techniques that are new to our construction. Note that the scheme in [96]
is single-authority; we extend it here to a multi-authority scheme.
Ciphertext composition in [96] is given by these equations:

C0 = M e(g, g)sα

C1 = g s

C2k = g fk

C3k = (θattk h)fk (w)−s

The ciphertext is composed of a data layer and an attribute layer. We refer to C0 and C1
as data-layer components, C2 and C3 as attribute-layer components, and each element in
C3 as an attribute component. The data-layer component C0 in [96] contains the message
M masked by the public key e(g, g)α of the (single) TA. Assuming that M is encrypted
under a set S of attributes, the attribute layer contains 2|S| components, i.e., two (C2k
and C3k ) for each attribute attk in the ciphertext. Each pair contains a uniform, randomly
chosen term fk that is local to the specific attribute attk . C3k also contains the attribute
attk itself. The two layers are connected by the binder term s.
The basic idea of our construction is as follows. Assume that we have a data owner,
a data client, two authorities (denoted Aut1 and Aut2 ), a client proxy, and a data user
u.4 Assume that the keys given to u by Aut1 and Aut2 are based on the access structures
4

For clarity, we do not use intermediaries in this simplified construction.
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att1 ∨ att2 and att4 , respectively.
The data owner wishes to encrypt a record M under a set S = {att1 , att3 } of attributes,
where att1 ∈ Uowner ∩ Uclient , but att3 ∈
/ Uowner ∩ Uclient . That is, att3 does not belong
to the client’s vocabulary and hence needs to undergo translation before it can be used for
decryption by u, using the keys she received from the authorities. In this example, we
assume that T (att3 ) = att4 ; that is, a correct translation of the attribute att3 ∈ Uowner is
att4 ∈ Uclient .
In order to encrypt M , the owner produces a two-level ciphertext; it is similar to the
one in [96] but differs in several respects.
First, instead of creating |S| attribute components C3k , one for each attribute, the
owner creates |S| ∗ |DECS | attribute components C3k,j , one for each pair (attribute, decryption party), where DECS represents the set of parties that participate in the decryption
of the ciphertext (decryption-parties set). In this example |DECS | = 2 because there are
two decryption parties: the user and the client proxy.
Second, we use the binder term s differently from the way it is used by Rouselakis and
Waters in [96]. In [96], the binder term is used in the data layer and in each attribute component. By contrast, we use secret sharing to break s into |DECS | shares: each attribute
component C3k,j contains only one share of the binder term, the one that corresponds to
the decryption party j. In this example, there are two decryption parties: the user and the
client proxy.
Third, recall that each attribute component in [96] contains the actual attribute to which
it corresponds. In our OTABE scheme, however, each attribute component contains the
output of a given transformation that is applied to the attribute. This enables the proxy to
translate the attribute obliviously without knowing its label or value. In our construction,
the transformation is a keyed PRF, but, as explained below, OTABE can accommodate a
richer set of transformations in order to better serve each organization’s business logic.
Fourth, we use another uniformly randomly chosen term, lk . Like fk , lk is local to
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the attribute component in which it appears. It is used to double blind the attribute part
(θattk h) of each attribute component, using dk = fk ∗ lk as a blinding factor; in this way,
fk can be used by the proxy as a token for oblivious translation.
Because of the composition of the ciphertext, the proxy is able to translate the attribute
att3 ∈ Uowner into a new attribute att4 ∈ Uclient . The proxy uses the attribute component
C3att3 ,proxy , an obfuscated version of the original attribute att3 , the tokens given to it
by the Encrypt() algorithm, and Equation 1 in the T ranslate() algorithm, where attk 0
corresponds to the new attribute (in our case, att4 ). In general, determination of the new
attribute is done obliviously based on the obfuscated original attribute’s label and value;
this determination is explained fully in Subsection 2.7.2.
When the user receives the translated record from the proxy, she combines it with her
own attribute-layer components and data-layer components to create the final aggregated
ciphertext. She uses the keys that she received from Aut1 and Aut2 to decrypt the aggregated ciphertext.5 Decryption with this equation uses secret sharing and the unique
structure of the translated attribute component received from the proxy, which includes
both an obfuscated version of the original attribute att3 and the new attribute att4 .
Finally, to enable hidden access policy, we do not attach the actual set of attributes S
to the ciphertext. Instead, both the data owner and the proxy compute an obfuscated value
of each attribute they add to the ciphertext, based on the PEKS construction given in [20].
Using trapdoors received from the TAs, u is able to perform a “blind intersection” of the
obfuscated values received with the ciphertext and her own obfuscated access structure’s
attributes received from the TAs. Thus, u is able to determine which attributes are required
for decryption without learning their values.
5
Decryption of aggregated ciphertexts is done using Equation 2, which is given (along with the rest of
the full construction) in Subsection 2.7.1).
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2.6.2

Other components of PRShare

PRShare combines the MA-OTABE construction in Subsection 2.7.1 with the following
building blocks:
• Pseudorandom functions: The data owner and each organization orgj agree on two
random k-bit keys Korg(j) and K1org(j) for the PRFs Fp : {0, 1}k × U → U and
F : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ .
• Collision-resistant hash function: If the parties wish to use the hidden-access-policy
feature, they agree on a collision-resistant hash function H.
• Searchable-encryption (SE) scheme, Λ: The input to the Distribute() algorithm is a
set I of ciphertexts’ ids. I is the output of SearchΛ , an SE scheme’s Search protocol,
executed by the CSP and a data user u. I contains the ids of ciphertexts whose
associated attributes satisfy the conjunctive query ψ sent by u to the CSP.
• Translation function: In the setup phase, each organization orgj provides to its proxy
the translation function Tj and the encrypted auxiliary information Ej (L) according
to which it should perform attribute translation.
Section 2.7 provides detailed descriptions of our MA-OTABE scheme and the associated attribute-translation procedure. However, for ease of exposition, it does not present
these contributions in their maximum generality or explain all of their features. We briefly
discuss some natural generalizations and interesting features here.
One essential feature of PRShare is oblivious translation of attributes in Sm by a semitrusted proxy. Oblivious translation is accomplished by applying a transformation to the
attribute inside each attribute component; this allows translation without disclosing the attributes’ values to the proxy. The version of the full construction given in Subsection 2.7.1
applies the same transformation to each attribute in the ciphertext, using two PRFs. This
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version demonstrates a specific translation operation in which the proxy performs oblivious equality tests and set-membership tests to determine the new attribute. However,
PRShare supports a more flexible approach in which different transformations are applied
to different attributes in the ciphertext, based on the attributes’ types and sensitivities. For
example, if attk ∈ Uowner is a numeric attribute, the proxy can translate it into a descriptive attribute att0k ∈ Uclient by comparing attk with a threshold that was provided to it by
the organization that it represents. It determines the value of the new, descriptive attribute
according to the result of that comparison. In such a case, we would choose an orderpreserving transformation instead of an equality-preserving transformation. Based on this
modular approach and other PRF-based transformations, PRShare enables a broader set of
translation operations that better suit organizations’ translation logic. These operations include oblivious addition, keyword search, and numeric comparison [26]. Subsection 2.7.2
contains concrete examples of attribute translation.
The full construction in Subsection 2.7.1 involves just one data client. In fact, a data
owner in PRShare can encrypt its data records once for use by multiple data clients, and it
need not know who the data clients are at encryption time. What it does need to know is
the universe T of TAs from which each data client chooses the set of TAs that it will use.
At encryption time, the owner uses the public keys of all t ∈ T to create C1, which is
the data layer. It creates the rest of the ciphertext’s components exactly as they are created
in Subsection 2.7.1. Now consider a client c that uses TAs T 0 ⊆ T . In the key-generation
phase, data users associated with c will receive two types of keys: regular secret keys,
issued by each TA in T 0 according to the keygen() algorithm, and dummy secret keys,
issued by TAs in T \ T 0 . Each dummy key represents a “decrypt all” policy and thus has
no effect when combined with the actual decryption policies represented by key issued by
TAs in T 0 .
Dummy keys are issued to each data user once during the setup phase, and the total
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number of TAs in the system is small. Furthermore, the attribute-layer components, which
constitute the longer part of the ciphertext, remain the same under this generalization.
Therefore, the performance of this generalized construction will be reasonable.
Query and retrieval of encrypted records in PRShare use a searchable encryption (SE)
scheme Λ. There is a CSP that stores ciphertext records that the data owner has created
using the Encrypt() algorithm and receives from data users requests that contain conjunctive queries on attributes in U. In PRShare, storage and processing of the data records (aka
“payloads”) is decoupled from storage and processing of their metadata. The SE scheme
can be chosen independently of the OTABE scheme, according to specific needs or privacy requirements of the client or owner. The only functionality that the SE scheme must
provide is:
1. The data user can submit to the CSP a conjunctive query that contains attributes in
Uowner ∩ Uclient .
2. The CSP is able to retrieve all the records that match the query, without learning the
query’s contents or the attributes associated with each record. Furthermore, the data
user cannot learn the attributes that are associated with each record, except for those
that appear in her query.
Upon receiving a query from a data user, the CSP searches for all the ciphertexts that
satisfy this query; for each one, it performs the Distribute() algorithm. Importantly, the
CSP need not perform any type of authentication or authorization of users. Each payload
and its associated attributes are stored in encrypted form according to the OTABE scheme,
and only users with suitable keys are able to decrypt the payload and the attributes. If a
user does not belong to a client organization that uses TAs in T , or if she does belong to
such an organization but has not been issued the necessary decryption keys for the records
that match her queries, she will learn nothing from the encrypted payloads and attributes
that the CSP sends her.
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Finally, note that the choice of SE scheme is highly flexible. One may choose a very
simple scheme, in which tags are created using PRFs with keys that shared among the
relevant entities (owner, CSP, and clients) or a more sophisticated schemes that provides
stronger security and privacy guarantees.

2.7
2.7.1

Detailed construction and translation function
Construction

We denote by org(k) the organization that governs the attribute attk . We denote by
pubΠ (Porgj ) the public key of a proxy Porgj , created using a standard public key encryption
scheme, Π.
Our MA-OTABE scheme consists of the following algorithms:
GlobalSetup(λ) ⇒ (P K): This algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ. It
defines bilinear groups G1,G2 of prime order p and a bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2.
The attribute universe is U = Zp . Finally, the algorithm selects θ, h, w randomly from G1.
It returns the global public key P K as follows:

P K = (G1, G2, p, θ, w, h, g, e)

AuthoritySetup(P K) ⇒ (P Ki , M SKi ): Each authority Auti chooses random
numbers αi , βi ∈ Zp . It sets P Ki = (e(g, g)αi , g βi ) as its public key and M SKi = (αi , βi )
as its master secret key.
Encrypt(M, P K, S, {P Ki }i∈Aut ) ⇒ (CT ): This algorithm takes as input a data
record’s payload M , the public keys for all authorities {P Ki }i∈Aut , and a set of attributes
S, |S| = R. It adds two attributes to S: attDAT E =< DAT E, ==, rand1 >, attGID =<
GID, ==, rand2 >. Both are randomly initialized. It then chooses 2|S| + 2 random
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exponents s, a, {fk }k∈[R] , {lk }k∈[R] ∈ Zp and computes {dk = fk ∗ lk }k∈[R] . The encryptor
determines, according to the nature of attributes in S, the subset ORGS of organization
proxies that are able to perform translations of the ciphertext. The set of parties involved
in decryption of C will include the set of proxies in ORGS and the final decryptor, i.e.,
the user. Hence |DECS | = |ORGS | + 1 = P . The encryptor chooses another P random
P
elements sj ∈ Zp ,
sj = s. It then encrypts M under S. The resulting ciphertext is
j∈DECS

composed of four elements: C0, C1, C2, C3 and a set T ok of tokens:

W = ga

C0 = M

Y

e(g, g)sαi

C1 = g s

C2k = {g dk |attk ∈ S}

i∈Aut

C3k,j =

[

c3k,j

c3k,j =

attk ∈S,
j∈DECS




D

if attLk ∈ Sim



Ek,j

if attLk ∈ Sm

k,j

where:

Dk,j = (θattk h)dk (w)−sj

C2 = {C2k |attk ∈ S}

Ek,j = (θFp (Korg(k) ,attk ) h)dk (w)−sj

C3 = {C3k,j |attk ∈ S, j ∈ DECS }

T okj = {T okk,j |attLk ∈ Sj }
T okk,j = [T ok1k,j ||T ok1k,j ||T ok1k,j ||T ok1k,j ]pubΠ (Porg(k) )
T ok1k,j = θlk

T ok2k,j = fk

T ok3k,j = F (K1org(k) , attLk )

T ok4k,j = Fp (Korg(k) , attk )
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C = (W, C0, C1, C2, C3, T ok = {T okj |j ∈ ORGS })
For each attribute attk where attLk ∈ Sim , the encryptor computes an obfuscated value
as follows:
Y k = e((g βaut(k) )a , H(attk )), where aut(k) denotes the authority that may use the attribute
attk in its access structure. The encryptor computes its signature, siguencryptor on each
element in C, as well as on the number of attributes that each proxy in ORGS is allowed to
translate. In addition, for each proxy, it computes a signature sigpencryptor on each element
in {C3k,p |attLk ∈ Sp }, on each element in T okj , and on the size of both sets. The encryptor
then uploads the following record to the cloud server:

CT = (C, U ID, P, Y = {Y k | ∀attLk ∈ Sim }, siguencryptor , {sigpencryptor |p ∈ ORGS })

KeyGen(P K, M SKi , Ai , u, t) ⇒ (SKi,u,t ): The key generation algorithm for Auti ,
user u and task t takes as input the master secret key M SKi and access structure Ai , determined by the authority based on the combination of data-centric attributes that it considers
to be a sufficient justification for decrypting a data record’s payload in the context of task
t and the role of user u. The authority determines a new or updated time limit for task
t, tlt , and creates a time-limit attribute: attLIM IT =< DAT E, <, tlt >. Lastly, given
the user’s GID u the authority creates a GID attribute, attGID =< GID, ==, u >. Auti
then creates A0i = Ai ∧ attLIM IT ∧ attGID , an updated version of Ai . To ensure the
hidden-access-policy feature, the authority replaces each attribute attx in the access structure, with a trapdoor H(attx )βi and transforms the resulting access structure into an LSSS
access structure (Mi ; ρ) where Mi is an ni×mi matrix and ρ is a function which associates
rows of Mi to attributes’ trapdoors. The algorithm chooses random y2 , . . . , ymi ∈ Zpn and
creates a vector vi = (αi ; y2 , . . . , ymi ). For c = 1, . . . , ni, it calculates: λi,c = Mi (c) · vi,
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where Mi (c) is the vector corresponding to the c’th row of the matrix Mi . In addition, the
algorithm chooses ni random exponents r1 , . . . , rni ∈ Zp . For each x ∈ [ni], it sets the
private key SKi,u,t as:
1
SKx,i,u,t
= g λi,x (w)rx

2
SKx,i,u,t
= (θρ(x) h)−rx

3
SKx,i,u,t
= g rx

Each authority Auti then sends:
1
2
3
SKi,u,t = {SKx,i,u,t
, SKx,i,u,t
, SKx,i,u,t
}x∈[ni]

to u. The user’s secret keys for task t are {SKi,u,t }i∈Aut .
Distribute(I) ⇒ ({C j |j ∈ DECS }): The input to the Distribute() algorithm is
a set of ciphertexts’ ids I. The cloud first retrieves all the ciphertexts that are associated
with ids in I. For a ciphertext CT , encrypted under a set of attributes S and retrieved by
the CSP, the CSP sends to each proxy, Porgp :
C p = ({C3k,p |attLk ∈ Sp }, P, sigpencryptor , T okp )

and sends to user u:

C u = {W, C0, C1, C2, C3u , P, Y, siguencryptor )

where:
C3u = {C3k,u |attk ∈ S} ∪ {C3k,p |attk ∈ S, org(k) 6= p}
T ranslate(P K, j = p, C p , {P Ki }i∈Aut ) ⇒ C 0p : the T ranslate() algorithm for a
proxy Porgp and a data record’s payload M encrypted under attribute S receives as input a
partial ciphertext C p . For each attribute component C3k,p that corresponds to an attribute
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attk to be translated, the proxy first verifies the encryptor’s signature. It then decrypts its
tokens using its private key and extracts each of them. It computes Tj (T ok3k,j , T ok4k,j ) =
attk 0 , thus obliviously translating the attribute attk into a new attribute, att0k . The function
Tj is determined separately by each organization; see Subsection 2.7.2. It then computes
0
a new value for Ek,p , Ek,p
:

−P T ok4k,p +P attk 0 T ok2k,p

0
Ek,p
= Ek,p · (T ok1k,p

)

0

= (θ(P attk −(P −1)Fp (Korg(k) ,attk )) h)dk w−sp
(2.1)

Finally, the proxy chooses a random exponent, c ∈ Zp , where Wp = g c , and computes, for each new attribute attk 0 that it created, an obfuscated value as follows: Y attk0 =
e((g βaut(k0 ) )c , H(attk0 )). We denote the set of obfuscated value corresponding to translated
attributes by proxy p as Yp . It then signs the new elements it added, as well as the number
of attributes it translated. It sends those signatures sigp and the translated partial ciphertext
to the user u. The record that is sent to the user is:

C 0p = (C 0 3p , sigp , Wp , Yp )

0
C 0 3p = {C 0 3k,p |attLk ∈ Sp } = {Ek,p
|attLk ∈ Sp }

Decrypt(P K, {SKi,u,t }, C u , {C 0j |j ∈ ORGS }) ⇒ M : The decryption algorithm
for data record’s payload M , encrypted under a set of attributes S and a user u takes
as input the global parameters, K secret keys {SKi,u,t }, representing access structures
{A0i }, and two types of ciphertexts: a partial ciphertext C u received directly from the CSP
and |ORGS | = P − 1 translated partial ciphertexts {C 0j |j ∈ ORGS }, received from
each one of the proxies in ORGS , C 0j = (C 0 3j , sigj , Wj , Yj ). After verifying both the
encryptor’s signatures and the proxies’ signatures, the user aggregates all the translated
partial ciphertexts she received from the proxies, extracts C3u from her partial ciphertext
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C u , and creates and updated version of C3, C 0 3:

C 0 3 = {C3k,u |attk ∈ S} ∪ {C3k,p |attk ∈ S, org(k) 6= p} ∪ {C 0 3j |j ∈ ORGS }

The user extracts C0, C1, C2 from C u and merges those with C 0 3. The final ciphertext is:

Cf = (C0, C1, C2, C 0 3)

The user then determines the attributes that are needed for decryption, as well as their
corresponding rows in the LSSS matrix of each authority. For a given access policy, represented by (Mi , ρ), the user uses W , received from the CSP and {Wj }j∈ORGS , received
from each proxy and computes the following set:

Si∗

=

[

s∗i

i∈[ni]

s∗i

=




e(W, ρ(i))

if attLk ∈ Sim



e(Worg(k) , ρ(i)) else

The user collects both the original attributes of the ciphertext and the ciphertext’s translated attributes, to create the final set of attributes T R(S) = Y ∪{Yj }j∈ORGS . By performing Ŝi = Si∗ ∩ T R(S), she receives the (obfuscated) set of attributes Ŝi that are needed for
decryption, Ii . This process is performed for each access policy (Mi , ρ)i∈Aut , resulting in
K obfuscated attribute sets Ii and corresponding index-sets Indi such that:
• For all c ∈ Indi , ρ(c) ∈ Ii .
• Exist constants, {wc,i ∈ Zp }c∈Indi , such that
The algorithm now recovers M by computing:
C0
B
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P

c∈Indi

wc,i Mi (c) = (1, 0, . . . , 0)

where:

B=

Y Y

2
1
))P
)(e(C2c , SKc,i,u,t
(e(C1, SKc,i,u,t

i∈Aut c∈Ii

2.7.2

Y

3
))wc,i
e(C 0 3c,j , SKc,i,u,t

(2.2)

j∈[P ]

Translation

The T ranslate() algorithm given in our construction assumes the existence of a set of
translation functions, {Tj |j ∈ ORG}. Each function is determined separately by each
organization orgj and determines how to translate attributes in Sj .
The translation of an attribute can be done in two ways: either by changing both the
label and the value of the attribute, or by keeping the attribute’s label and only changing
its value. A translation may require auxiliary information, provided to the proxy by its
organization. In such a case, the translation is done by performing an oblivious operation
on the attribute, that is encrypted using a certain transformation, and on another object (a
number, a list etc), the “auxiliary information,” that is encrypted using the same transformation. Such an oblivious operation can be a comparison, equality test, list membership
test, keyword search etc. Since both the attribute inside the ciphertext and the organizationspecific auxiliary information are encrypted using the same keyed transformation, with a
key that is unknown to the proxy, the proxy can perform the translation without learning
the attribute’s value and without learning the contents of the private auxiliary information
provided by the organization.
On a high level, the transformation applied by organization orgj to a data structure L
that contains multiple auxiliary information items, l ∈ L, works by treating each item l as
the value of the corresponding attribute’s label in Sowner , mapping the resulting attribute
to an element in U, and using the transformation to encrypt that element. The result, the
encryption of auxiliary information L that belongs to an organization orgj , is denoted by
Ej (L). A similar process is used for auxiliary information that includes only one element

50

l such as a threshold or a descriptive statistic.
Each organization prepares a lookup table, where entries represent obfuscated labels
and values contain the translation logic and auxiliary information used for translation of
attributes with that label. Using the same obfuscated label received from the owner, the
proxy knows what logic and auxiliary information should it use for the translation of the attribute in its hands. It then uses the obfuscated value (in our construction, a PRF-encrypted
value) of the attribute that the proxy obtained from the owner to compute the new attribute,
using the translation logic and auxiliary information.
We now present three important examples. For simplicity, in the following examples
we fix a specific translation function and refer to it as T . In addition, we use T as if it takes
one argument, namely the original attribute. In practice (as shown in our construction),
in order to support oblivious translation, a function Tj is a two-argument function, neither
contains the actual original attribute, but instead, an obfuscated version of both the label
and the value. In our construction, we use two PRFs for that purpose.
Dynamic translation between vocabularies: As discussed, translation of an attribute
from orgowner ’s vocabulary to orgclient ’s vocabulary is done according to the specific attribute being translated as well as the specific needs and work methodologies of the client
organization.
One of the main reasons why attribute translation is essential for supporting multiple
vocabularies, is that while the encryption of a data record’s payload is done by the owner
once, the relevance of the data record to the client changes over time. In ABE terms, that
means that while the set of attributes under which a ciphertext is encrypted, taken from
one vocabulary, does not change, the question whether or not this set satisfies a given
access policy, taken from another vocabulary, does change over time. Furthermore, such
decision, of whether or not a ciphertext is relevant to the client at a given point in time is
made using external information, the “auxiliary information,” that is related to one or more
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of the owner’s, client’s, and intermediaries’ professional domains. Because the auxiliary
information changes over time, so does the decision whether or not the set of attributes
of a given data record should satisfy a given access policy. Values of such attributes with
respect to a data record cannot be fully determined at encryption time, but should rather
be dynamically translated, only when a data user needs to access that data record. OTABE
supports such dynamic attributes, as shown below.
We consider here two examples, representing common translation operations used for
translating attributes from Uowner .
The first operation, is determining the new attribute according to the original attribute’s
membership in a list provided by the client organization or an intermediary. Since both the
attribute and the list-items are encrypted using the output of a PRF, such translation can be
done obliviously.
To illustrate, we continue with the watchlist example given in Subsection 2.2.2. Two
pieces of metadata that ESPs collect about their customers’ email messages are the sender
and receiver of the email. Such attributes, however, cannot be used in the secret keys issued by the LE agency to its employees: unless the investigation is targeted (and therefore
the data subject’s UID such as phone number or email address are known in advance), a
raw email address will be meaningless in terms of justification for decryption, and therefore cannot be used for determining the relevance of a certain ciphertext to one of the
LE agency’s investigations. Furthermore, exposing raw sender’s and receiver’s email addresses to agents in the LE agency will violate the privacy of data subjects that do not
appear on any watchlist. Hence, the translation of the attribute “sender” is a boolean attribute that indicates whether the sender of the email appears on an existing watchlist.
Such an attribute better suits the daily activity of the LE agency as well as protects innocent citizens’ privacy and thus can be included in the key in order to determine whether an
access to an email address is justified. Clearly, such a list cannot be revealed to an external
entity, including the ESP.
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Note that the raw email address’s relevance to a given investigation may vary over
time. This is because the auxiliary information, i.e., the watchlist, may change periodically
and thus the membership of a data subject associated with a given email address in the
watchlist may change over time as well. This is why such attributes can only be translated
dynamically, when an agent submits an access request for that specific email record.
We now show how the data client, the LE agency, encrypts the watchlist. The watchlist
L contains multiple items, l ∈ L, that represent data subjects’ ids (for example, email
addresses). In order for the watchlist to be compatible with the “sender” attribute under
which email messages are encrypted, the LE agency performs the following preprocessing
step on the watchlist:
f or l in watchlist :
Ej=client (watchlist).add(Fp (Korgj=client , < label = SEN DER, operator = “ ==00
, value = l >))
Where Eclient (watchlist) represents the resulting, encrypted watchlist, containing multiple “sender” attributes, and thus compatible with the “sender” attribute used by the ESP.

Assuming attk =< SEN DER, ==, c > represents a sender’s email address, c,
attk 0 =< ON − W AT CHLIST, ==, b > is a boolean attribute that represents whether
the sender appears on a watchlist, and Eorgj (L) represents an encryption of the watchlist
L as described above, the value of b is determined by the proxy as follows:
Contains(Eorgj (L), T ok4k,j ) = b
The second operation, is determining the new attribute by comparing it to one or more
numeric auxiliary information pieces that usually represent either a certain threshold that
is related to the attribute’s value, or aggregated statistics about other data records that share
the same attribute. In this case, instead of an equality-preserving transformation, we will
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use an order-revealing transformation such as the ORE scheme presented in [26], denoted
by ΠORE (which also makes use of a PRF). Since both the attribute and the threshold or the
descriptive statistic with which the attribute is to be compared are encrypted using ΠORE ,
such translation can be done obliviously.
To illustrate, we consider the insurance-company example discussed in Subsection 2.2.2.
We consider the attribute: “credit utilization ratio,” used by the CRA to store credit reports.
Such attribute, however, cannot be used in the secret keys issued by the insurance company
to its employees, as a raw number will be meaningless in terms of determining whether a
consumer is a good candidate for an insurance offer, and therefore cannot be used to determine the relevance of a certain credit report to an employee’s task. Furthermore, exposing
the exact utilization ratio to insurance company’s employees will violate consumers’ privacy. Hence, the translation of the numeric attribute “credit utilization ratio” is a boolean
attribute that indicates whether that ratio is below the average ratio. Such attribute better
suits the daily activity of the insurance company as well as protects consumers’ privacy
to the extent possible. Therefore, it can be included in employees’ keys in order to determine whether the insurance company finds the data subject a good-enough candidate for
an insurance offer (in other words, whether an access to the data subject’s credit report is
justified). In this case the translation will be made by the credit card company’s proxy,
acting as an intermediary, by obliviously comparing the number that represents the consumer’s credit utilization ratio to the average utilization ratio of its customers. Clearly, the
average utilization ratio that is calculated by each credit card company based on its own
customers, constitutes proprietary information of the company and should not be revealed
to other organizations.
As in the previous example, the auxiliary information (the utilization ratio’s average)
may change periodically. Thus, whether or not the utilization ratio of a data subject is
above average may change over time. This is why such an attribute can only be translated
dynamically, when an employee submits an access request for that specific credit report.
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Assuming attk =< CREDIT − U T ILIZAT ION − RAT IO, ==, c > represents
the credit utilization ratio, c,
attk 0 =< IS − CREDIT − RAT IO − LESS − T HAN − AV ERAGE, ==, b > is
a boolean attribute that represents whether the credit utilization ratio is above the current
average, as calculated by the credit card company, and Eorgj (l) represents an encryption
of the average l using ΠORE , the value of b is determined by the proxy as follows:
ΠORE .COM P ARE(Eorgj (l), T ok4k,j ) = b
Note that in both cases, both the label and the value of the attributes are being translated.
Key-level revocation: Porgclient translates the value of the attribute attk =< DAT E, ==
, rand > from the c-bit random value (its default value given at encryption time by the
data owner) to the current date (or the current time stamp, if a time limit is expressed
using time instead of dates) datecur and so T (attk ) = attk 0 =< DAT E, ==, datecur >.
In this case, only the value of the attribute is being translated. Note that access structures
in our system contain a time-limit attribute of the form: < DAT E, <, tlt >, where tlt is
the per-task time limit, assigned by the TAs.
User-level revocation: Given a data user’s GID u who sent a data retrieval request,
Porgclient performs the following: it first checks whether u appears in orgclient ’s revocation list. If so, it aborts. Otherwise, the proxy translates the value of the attribute
attk =< GID, ==, rand > from the c-bit random value (its default value given at encryption time by the data owner) to the data user’s GID u and so T (attk ) = attk 0 =<
GID, ==, u >. Note, that if the revocation list contains the data user’s GID, the partial
ciphertext C 0Porgclient will not be sent to the data user who initiated the retrieval request.
Furthermore, in such a case attGID will remain with its default random value assigned by
orgowner .
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In both revocation events, only the attribute’s value is being translated, as the original
attributes serve as placeholders. Thus, the proxy only needs to know the original attributes’
obfuscated labels in order to perform the translation.

2.8

Results

We now give the formal statements and full proofs of the properties of the scheme presented in Section 2.7.
Lemma 1 If n ≥ 2 and t ≤ n, then (q, t, n)-DBTDH ⇒ q-DBDH.
From Definition 3, it is enough to prove that (q, n, n)-DBTDH ⇒ q-DBDH.
Given a distinguisher D1 which is able to tell a (q, n, n)-DBTDH term from a random
term with non-negligible probability, we want to show that there exists a polynomial distinguisher D2 which is able to tell a q-DBDH term from a random term with non-negligible
advantage. We are given the terms:
2

Ω1 = {g, g x , g y } ∪ {g bl , g y/bl , g y
2

Ω2 = {g z , g (xz) }∪{g xzbl , g xz/bl , g x

2 zb

l

2 /b2
l

2

|∀l ∈ [q]} ∪ {g ybl /bf |∀l, f ∈ [q], l 6= f }
2

|∀l ∈ [q]}∪{g xyzbl /bf , g (xz)

2 b /b
l f

, g xzbl /bf |∀l, f ∈ [q], l 6= f }

and R, where R is either a q-DBDH term e(g, g)xyz or a random term. We choose a set
A = {ai }, where each ai is randomly selected from Zp (note that for the (q, n, n)-DBTDH,
V is uniquely determined, as V = [n]) and compute, for each element in Ω2 , a new term:

Pn

ai

Pn

ai )2

Pn

ai

h1 = (g z )
2

h2 = (g (xz) )(

h3 = (g xzbl )

i=1

i=1

i=1
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Pn

= g(

i=1
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Pn

= g (x(

i=1

Pn

= g x(

i=1

ai z))2

ai z)bl

Pn

ai

= g x(

Pn

ai

= gx

Pn

ai

= g xy(

h4 = (g xz/bl )
h5 = (g x

2 zb

l

)

2

h6 = (g xyzbl /bf )
2 b /b
l f

h7 = (g (xz)

)(

i=1

i=1

i=1

Pn

i=1

ai )2

Pn

i=1

2(

ai z)/bl

Pn

ai z)bl

Pn

ai z)bl /b2f

i=1

= g (x(

i=1

Pn

i=1

ai )z)2 bl /bf

,

Ψ0l,f = {(g xzbl /bf )ai |i ∈ [n]} = {g x(ai z)bl /bf |i ∈ [n]}
We set Ω02 as:
Ω02 = {h1, h2} ∪ {h3, h4, h5||∀l ∈ [q]} ∪ {h6, h7, Ψ0l,f |∀l, f ∈ [q], l 6= f }
Pn

Note, that if R is a q-DBDH term, then R0 = R(

i=1

ai )

Pn

= e(g, g)xy(

i=1

ai z)

is a (q, n, n)-

DBTDH term, and if R is a random term then R0 is a random term. We then view
(Ω1 , Ω02 , R0 ) as input to the oracle D1 to obtain correct value b ∈ {0, 1} (b = 0 if the
answer of D1 is (q, n, n)-DBTDH term, and 1 otherwise). Therefore, we have a polynomial distinguisher D2 which is able to tell q-DBDH term from a random term with same
non-negligible advantage.
Theorem 1 If (q, n, n)-DBTDH holds, then our MA-OTABE scheme achieves selective
security against all PPT adversaries with a challenge attribute set S of size W , where
W ≤ q, and a challenge decryption-parties set DECS* of size P , where P ≤ n.
To prove the theorem we will assume that there exists a PPT adversary A with a
challenge attribute set S and a challenge decryption-parties set DECS* , which has a nonnegligible advantage in selectively breaking our MA-OTABE scheme. Using A we will
build a PPT simulator B that attacks the (q, n, n)-DBTDH assumption with a non-negligible
advantage.6 .
6

For simplicity, we prove our attribute-secrecy related claims separately, in Theorem 3. We also omit the
signatures that are attached to some of the messages in our construction
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Init: The simulator receives the given terms from the assumption. The adversary
chooses the challenge attribute set S, where |S| = W . Based on S, the adversary chooses
the challenge decryption-parties set DECS* , where DECS* ⊆ DECS and |DECS* | = P .
The adversary chooses a subset of corrupted authorities Autc . We assume all authorities
but one are corrupted, and denote the honest authority by Auth . The adversary sends Autc ,
Auth , S and DECS* to the simulator.
Setup: We denote S as {att1 , . . . , attW } and the set of indexes of attributes in S as IS .
The simulator chooses h∗ , u∗ randomly from Zp . For each attribute attl it chooses el
randomly from Zp . It then computes the global public parameters:

w = gx
∗

θ = gu

Y

2

(g y/bl )

l∈IS
∗

h = gh

Y

(g xz/bl el )

Y

2

(g y/bl )−attl

l∈IS

l∈IS

Based on the global public parameters, the simulator creates the parameters for authority Auti , as follows:
For every Auti ∈ Autc , the simulator chooses random ni ∈ Zp , and sets M SKi =
−xni . It computes P Ki = e(g, g)M SKi = e(g x , g −(ni ) ). The simulator sends M SKi
P
and P Ki to the adversary. For Auth , the simulator sets M SKh = xy + x i∈Autc ni .
Q
It computes P Kh = e(g x , g y ) i∈Autc e(g x , g ni ). The simulator sends only P Kh to the
adversary.
Phase 1: The adversary chooses a revocation list RL and sends it to the simulator.
Then it may issue any polynomial number of private key queries, for tuples of (access
structure, GID, task identifier), and sends those to the simulator.
For a query: (access structure=AC, GID=u, task=t), the simulator does the following:
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For queries issued for a corrupted authority Auti ∈ Autc , the adversary runs SKiut =
KeyGen(P K, M SKi , AC, u, t) itself, as it has M SKi , given to it in the setup phase. For
queries issued for the honest authority Auth , the simulator provides the answer. The simulator determines a time limit for task t, tlt , and creates a time-limit attribute: attLIM IT =<
DAT E, <, tlt >. In addition, given the GID in the query u the simulator creates a
GID attribute, attGID =< GID, ==, u >. It then creates an updated version of AC,
AC 0 = AC ∧ attLIM IT ∧ attGID and performs the following:
• If S |= AC 0 and u ∈
/ RL, the simulator will abort.
• If S |= AC 0 and u ∈ RL, S must contain SGID = u. The simulator picks a GID u0 ,
u0 6= u, and generates the secret key using SKhu0 t = KeyGen(P K, M SKh , AC, u0 , t)
• If S 6|= AC 0 , the simulator generates the secret key using
SKhut = KeyGen(P K, M SKh , AC, u, t).
We will now show how the simulator produces the secret keys in the last two cases.
• In the second case, the simulator first creates att0GID =< GID, ==, u0 >. Then it
needs to create a key for AC ∗ = AC ∧ att0GID ∧ attLIM IT .
• In the third case, the simulator needs to create a key for AC ∗ = AC 0 .
∗

Those access policies are represented by an LSSS matrix M AC with dimensions l × n
and a row-mapping function ρ. Note, that in both cases S is not authorized for AC ∗ .
∗

Hence, we can split M AC ’s rows into two sets:

A = {r|r ∈ [l], ρ(r) ∈ S}

B = {r| r ∈ [l], ρ(r) ∈
/ S}
∗

where A, B 6= ∅. Since S is not authorized for M AC , from the properties of LSSS we can
∗

find a vector β ∈ Zpn with β1 = 1 fixed such that ∀r ∈ A, MrAC β = 0.
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The simulator then chooses uniformly at random n − 1 random elements in Zp , vi , and
sets the shares of M SKh as:
λr =< MrAC∗ , Θ >
Where:
Θ = M SKh β + (0, v2 , . . . , vn )⊥
Hence, row’s r share is:
∗

λr =< MrAC , (M SKh β + (0, v2 , . . . , vn )⊥ ) >=
∗

xy < MrAC , β > +x

∗

X

∗

ni < MrAC , β > + < MrAC , (0, v2 , . . . , vn )⊥ >=

i∈Autc
∗

xy < MrAC , β > +x

X

∗

ni < MrAC , β > +λ0r

i∈Autc

Now, let us see how the simulator computes the secret key for r ∈ A: From definition,
∗

r ∈ A → ρ(r) ∈ S. From LSSS properties, < MrAC , β >= 0. Thus in this case,
∗

λr = λ0r =< MrAC , (0, v2 , . . . , vn )⊥ >

and hence, its value is known to the simulator. The simulator can then compute the key
components SK 1 , SK 2 , SK 3 as in the KeyGen algorithm:
0

SK 1 = g λr wtr = g λr g xar
∗

SK 2 = (θρ(r) h)−tr = ((g u

Y

∗

2

(g y/bl ))ρ(r) (g h

Y
l∈IS

l∈IS

(g xz/bl el ) ·

Y

2

(g y/bl )−attl ))−ar

l∈IS

SK 3 = g tr = g ar
where tr = ar are randomly selected from Zp by the simulator and λr = λ0r .
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Finally, for r ∈ B, the simulator will compute the secret key in the following way:
From definition, r ∈ B → ρ(r) ∈
/ S. In this case, the simulator will define

tr = −

∗

X

∗

(ni ) < MrAC , β > −y < MrAC , β > +

i∈Autc

X xzbl < M AC ∗ , β >
r
+ t0r
ρ(r)
−
att
l
l∈I
S

where t0r is randomly selected from Zp . Hence the key components can be computed
as:

0

SK 1 = g λr wtr = g λr

Y

(g x

2 zb

l

AC ∗ ,β>/(ρ(r)−att )
l

)<Mr

0

· g xtr

l∈[n]

SK 2 = (θρ(r) h)−tr = g
·

Y

P

AC ∗ ,β>(ρ(r)u∗ +h∗ )
i∈Autc (ni )<Mr

AC ∗ ,β>(ρ(r)u∗ +h∗ )

(g y )<Mr

∗ +h∗ )<M AC ∗ ,β>/(ρ(r)−att )
l
r

(g xzbl )−(ρ(r)u

l∈IS

·

2b

Y

(g (xz)

f /bl el

AC ∗ ,β>/(ρ(r)−att )
f

)−<Mr

Y

Y

(g y

2 /b2
l

AC ∗ ,β>(ρ(r)−att )
l

)<Mr

l∈IS

(l,f )∈IS

·

·

P

(g xz/bl el )

AC ∗ ,β>
i∈Autc (ni )<Mr

l∈IS

·

Y

2

P

(g y/bl )

AC ∗ ,β>(ρ(r)−att )
l
i∈Autc (ni )<Mr

l∈IS

·

2

Y

AC ∗ ,β>(ρ(r)−att )/(ρ(r)−att )
l
f

(g xzy(bf /bl ) )−<Mr

0

· (θρ(r) h)−tr

(l,f )∈IS
l6=f

SK 3 = g tr = (g)−

P

AC ∗ ,β>
i∈Autc (ni )<Mr

AC ∗ ,β>

(g y )−<Mr

·

Y

AC ∗ ,β>/(ρ(r)−att )
l

(g xzbl )<Mr

0

· g tr

l∈IS

Therefore, in both cases the simulator can reply to the adversary’s query with the entire
secret key. Note, that since AC, AC 0 ⊆ Uclient , and SGID , SLIM IT ∈ Uclient , AC ∗ ⊆
Uclient , and so does the secret key given to the adversary. In addition, all the secret key’s
terms, both for A and for B can be calculated by the simulator using terms from the
assumption, the challenge set S (chosen by the adversary), and the access structure AC
(chosen by the adversary).
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Challenge: A submits two messages, m0 and m1 to the simulator. In addition, for
every proxy in DECS* , j, it sends a bit aj to the simulator. The simulator then flips a
random coin b and encrypts mb under S: CT = Encrypt(mb , P K, S, {P Ki }i∈Aut ), by
implicitly setting s = z, {lk = bk |∀k ∈ IS }, {fk = ek |∀k ∈ IS }, {dk = bk ek |∀k ∈ IS }
and {sj = zj |∀j ∈ DECS* }. For each proxy j ∈ DECS* , the simulator creates a partial
ciphertext C j = ({C3k,j |attLk ∈ Sj }, P, T okj ) using the Distribute algorithm, and, if
aj = 1, performs C 0j = T ranslate(P K, j, C j , {P Ki }i∈Aut ). Note, that for every proxy
j such that aj = 1, if an attribute attLk ∈ Sj , the simulator has two attributes in its hands:
the original attribute attk and the translated attribute, attk0 . Finally, the simulator extracts
C0, C1, C2, C3 = {C3k,j |attk ∈ S, j ∈ DECS* }, T ok from CT , and extracts C 0 3j =
{C 0 3k,j |attLk ∈ Sj } from each translated partial ciphertext, C 0j . The simulator then sends
the translated ciphertext C ∗ to A. Note, that each element in C ∗ can be computed using
terms from the assumption:

C ∗ = {C0, C1, C2, C ∗ 3, T ok}
where:

C0 = mb ·e(g, g)xys = mb ·R

∗

C 3=

[

∗

c 3k,j

C1 = g s = g z

∗

c 3k,j =

attk ∈S,
j∈DECS*
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C2 = {g dk |attk ∈ S} = {g bk ek |attk ∈ S}




C 0 3

if attLk ∈ Sj ∧ aj = 1



C3k,j

otherwise

k,j

From the construction,



Dk,j





c∗ 3k,j =

if attLk ∈ Sim
/ Sj ) ∨ (attLk ∈ Sj ∧ aj = 0)
if (attLk ∈ Sm ∧ attLk ∈

Ek,j






0
Ek,j

if attLk ∈ Sj ∧ aj = 1

Now, the simulator can compute the following terms using terms from the assumption:
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Phase 2: Phase 1 is repeated.
Guess: The adversary outputs a guess b0 of b. If b = b0 the challenger outputs 0, i.e. it
claims that the challenge term is R = e(g, g)xyz . Otherwise, it outputs 1 to indicate that it
believes R is a random group element.
If R = e(g, g)xyz then A played the proper security game, because C = mb · R =
mb · e(g, g)xys . On the other hand, if R is a random term then all information about the

64

message mb is lost in the challenge ciphertext. Therefore the advantage of A is exactly 0.
As a result if A breaks the proper security game with a non negligible advantage, then B
has a non negligible advantage in breaking the (q, n, n)-DBTDH assumption.
Theorem 2 Let C = (M )S be a MA-OTABE ciphertext. No coalition of at most |DECS |−
1 parties can learn anything about M .
Let M be a message to be encrypted under an MA-OTABE scheme and a set of attributes S. Let |DECS | = n. Additionally, let Φ be a colluding set, |Φ| = n − 1.
From our definition, the colluding set might contain either all the proxies in ORGS or
a subset of |ORGS | − 1 proxies from ORGS and the data user. Since the information that
the colluding set has in the former case is a subset of the information that it has in the latter
case, it is enough to prove the lemma for the latter case.7
We claim that no information about the data layer, represented by data-layer components C0 and C1, can be inferred from translation tokens, as well as any combination of
attribute-layer components held by members of Φ.
Attribute-layer components include C2 = {C2k |attk ∈ S} and C3 = {C3k,j |attk ∈
S, j ∈ DECS }. Each attribute component C3k,j includes two parts: a “local randomness”
part, either (θattk h)dk or (θFp (Korg(k) ,attk ) h)dk and a binder-term part (w)−sj , while C2 =
{g dk |attk ∈ S} contains only a “local randomness” part.
Since each fk , lk are chosen uniformly at random, so does dk . In addition, each dk
is local to the attribute-layer components corresponding to attk , {C2k }, {C3k,j } in which
it appears, and does not appear in attribute-layer components that correspond to other
attributes, and, more importantly, in the data layer. Therefore, the local-randomness parts
of any combination of attribute-layer components C2 and C3 are independent of the data
7

Theoretically, the colluding set may include proxies that do not belong to ORGS ; because they do
not participate in the translation of C, they are not given any partial ciphertext related to C. Since each
ciphertext’s elements are individually randomized, even if such proxies are part of the colluding set, they
will not be able to provide any information that may contribute to the collusion attempt.
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layer. Furthermore, each token, set of tokens or combination of sets of tokens in T ok =
{T okj |j ∈ Φ} are also independent of the data layer. This means that, any information
about the data layer, and therefore, the plaintext, can only be obtained using a combination
of binder term parts taken from various attribute components C3k,j that parties j ∈ Φ hold.
We now show that any such combination provides no information about the the binder
term, and hence, no information on the data layer.
Let us look at any n − 1 combination of binder term parts held by members of Φ. We
define the following random variables:

{Si }1≤i≤n = w−si

Consider a set of n − 1 binder-term parts, T . If T does not include Sn , it must contain
S1 , . . . , Sn−1 . Since s1 , . . . , sn−1 are chosen uniformly at random from Zp , S1 , . . . , Sn−1
are independent random variables. If T does include Sn , assume without loss of generality that T = {S1 , S2 , . . . , Sn−2 , Sn }. Clearly, the first n − 2 variables are indepenPn−1
Pn−1
Qn−2 −1
dent. Sn = w−sn = w−s+ i=1 si = w−(s+ i=1 −si ) = (ws Sn−1 i=1
Si ) depends on
S1 , S2 , . . . , Sn−2 , but also on the missing Sn−1 . Sn−1 is independent of S1 , . . . , Sn−2 . Each
distinct value of Sn−1 produces a distinct value of Sn . Therefore Sn is independent of the
first n−2 Si ’s. In both cases, all n−1 elements in T appear to the adversary as independent
random numbers, and give no information about the binder term.
Thus, for any colluding set of size at most n − 1 = |DECS | − 1, any combination
of tokens and attribute-layer components which members of Φ are given as part of the
protocol provide no information about the data layer, and hence, about the plaintext M .
Lemma 2 Let C = (M )S be a MA-OTABE ciphertext. The proxies in an MA-OTABE
scheme cannot learn anything about M , even if they all collude.
The proof follows from Theorem 2 since every colluding set of at most |DECS | − 1
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parties cannot learn any information about M and, by definition, only |DECS | − 1 proxies
participate in each ciphertext’s translation.
Theorem 3 Let F and Fp be two PRFs used in the construction of our MA-OTABE
scheme. If F and Fp are secure, then the scheme achieves attribute secrecy.
Consider a message M , encrypted under a set of attributes S resulting in a ciphertext
C.
Hidden access policy: We consider both the servers, and the data users:
CSP, proxies: The set of attributes Y that is stored with the ciphertext on the CSP
includes only the obfuscated values of immutable attributes from S. In addition, neither
the CSP nor the proxies are given any trapdoors for attributes in S. Thus, Y is hidden from
the servers (for more details, the reader is referred to [20]).
Apart from Y , an attribute attk ∈ S may appear in the ciphertext only within the attribute components {C3k,j } to which the attribute corresponds. Immutable attributes can
only appear within Dk,j , as the exponent of θ inside the local randomness part. Since each
local randomness part in which the attribute itself appears is blinded by a local, uniformly
random chosen element, known only to the owner, the attribute remains hidden. Muta0
ble attributes in S can appear within Ek,j or Ek,j
, as the exponent of θ inside the local
0
randomness part, or in T ok3k,j , T ok4k,j . In both Ek,j and Ek,j
, each local randomness

part in which the attribute itself appears is blinded by a local, uniformly random chosen
element, known only to the owner. Furthermore, In both Ek,j , T ok3k,j and T ok4k,j , either
attk or attLk only appear in their encrypted form, using a keyed PRF with a key that is
unknown to the CSP, or to any proxy. Lastly, each PRF-encrypted term inside T ok3k,j and
T ok4k,j is encrypted using the public key of the proxy who is allowed to translate attk
(“the translator”). Hence, mutable attributes inside the ciphertext remain hidden as well.
Data users: We start by defining the term “terminal attributes.” Terminal attributes
include either immutable attributes, or attributes which are the result of an attribute trans67

lation performed by one of the proxies. Intuitively, those are the attributes that the data user
will eventually receive with the ciphertext, and thus must be kept hidden from the user, in
such a manner that enables her to know which attributes should she use for decryption.
Each immutable attribute in S is replaced by the owner at encryption time by an obfuscated value of that attribute,
e((g βaut(k) )c , H(attk )), derived from the PEKS construction in [20] where c is a random
number, creating the set Y .
When a proxy Porgj performs a translation of an attribute, it computes an obfuscated
value of the new attribute that it created, and only that obfuscated value is attached to the
translated partial ciphertext that it sends to the user, as Yj .
The data user never receives the actual S. Instead, it receives T R(S) = Y ∪{Yj }j∈ORGS
where Y represents immutable attributes in S and {Yj } represent the set of mutable attributes in S. Hence, all the terminal attributes are obfuscated, and therefore remain hidden from the user (for more details, the reader is referred to [20]). Note, however, that
unlike the servers, data users do hold trapdoors for attributes that appear in their access
policies, H(attk )βaut(k) , and those trapdoors do leak some information about the attributes
in S. Such leakage to the data user is limited to those attributes in S that also appear in the
user’s access policy; that is, the user learns nothing about attributes in S that are not in her
access policy. Such leakage includes, for instance, the ability of the user to know whether
an attribute in S, that also appears in the user’s access policy, appeared in previous ciphertexts that the user has retrieved from the CSP (we note that the source of such leakage is
the transitivity of the equality operation, not the attributes’ actual values. The user is not
able to learn any of the attributes in S, even for those attributes that appear in her access
policy).
Oblivious translation: A proxy Porgj uses its partial ciphertext, its tokens, and auxiliary
information in order to perform a translation of an attribute attk . We claim that neither of
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the items above reveals the attribute attk .
Within the partial ciphertext, an attribute attk such that
attLk ∈ Sj can only appear in the attribute components {C3k,j } to which the attribute attk
corresponds, within Ek,j , as the exponent of θ inside the local randomness part. However,
each local randomness part within an element Ek,j in which the attribute appears is blinded
by a local, uniformly random chosen element, known only to the owner.
Tokens include fk , θlk , which cannot provide any information about attk . Tokens also
include the label and the value of attk , each encrypted using a different keyed PRF (F
and Fp ). The keys of both F and Fp are shared between the owner and orgj , and are
unknown to the proxy. Auxiliary information pieces are also encrypted using the same
keyed PRFs, with the same key used for encryption of the attribute to be translated by the
proxy. Hence, if F and Fp are secure, attk remains hidden from the proxy. As discussed
in Subsection 2.6.2, the PRF can be replaced with other transformations that better suit
the translation logic of each organization, e.g., order-preserving transformations. Often
such transformations also use PRFs to some extent. In this case, because both the original
attribute and the auxiliary information will be encrypted using the same transformation,
using a key that is unknown to the proxy, the original attribute will remain hidden from
the proxy as well.
Lastly, we would like to note that though the translation is done obliviously and the
proxy does not learn the original attribute, it does leak some information about the original
attribute, as well as the auxiliary information, to the proxy. For instance, the proxy is
able to know, because of the deterministic encryption, which attributes in Sj are used in
different ciphertexts, as equality can be determined based on the PRF-encrypted value.
However, at least some sort of leakage appears to be inherent, as this is exactly what
enables the proxy to perform the functionality required from it in our scheme. Also note,
that such leakage is limited to the translator. This is because each attribute component that
is meant to undergo translation by a proxy has two encryption layers: In the outer layer,
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we use strong encryption, based on traits of our proposed scheme as discussed in Theorem
1 or on traits of Π; all system entities except the translator will be unable to decrypt this
layer. Only the translator is able to decrypt the outer layer and access the inner layer,
which contains the actual attribute encrypted in a “weaker” encryption that enables it to
perform the translation.
Attribute privacy: We consider the data owner and the data client:
Data client: Given a translated attribute v ∈ Uclient , such that M AP −1 (M, v) is a mutable attribute, M AP −1 (M, v) may appear either within the attribute components {C3k,j }
to which the attribute v corresponds, inside an element Ek,j , or within T ok3k,j , T ok4k,j .
In both the ciphertext and the tokens, M AP −1 (M, v) only appears in its encrypted form,
using a keyed PRF with a key that is unknown to any member of orgclient . Furthermore,
each local randomness part inside each element Ek,j in which M AP −1 (M, v) appears, is
blinded by a local, uniformly random chosen element, known only to the owner. Lastly,
PRF-encrypted terms inside T ok3k,j , T ok4k,j are encrypted using the translator’s public
key, and can only be decrypted by the translator.
Hence, for every attribute v ∈ Uclient such that M AP −1 (M, v) is a mutable attribute,
orgclient does not learn M AP −1 (M, v).
Data owner: For every mutable attribute s ∈ S, the Encrypt() algorithm given in
our construction does not require any knowledge about M AP (M, s). Furthermore, for
each s ∈ S, the resulting ciphertext, C (including both ciphertext’s elements and translation tokens), does not contain M AP (M, s). Lastly, for every mutable attribute s ∈ S,
data owners participating in PRShare receive neither terms that include M AP ((M, s), nor
terms that can provide any information on the value of M AP (M, s).
Hence, for every attribute s ∈ Uowner such that s is a mutable attribute, orgowner does
not learn M AP (M, s).
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(a) Data query

(b) Encryption

(c) Key generation

Figure 2.1: Typical running times in seconds
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2.9

Implementation and evaluation

To assess the feasibility of our framework, we implemented the full version of our OTABE
scheme using Charm, a framework developed for rapidly prototyping advanced cryptosystems [4]. Charm was used to develop multiple, prominent existing ABE schemes, including that of Rouselakis and Waters [96]. We instantiated our implementation using a 256-bit
Barreto-Naehrig (BN) curve. Note that in our implementation, we translated our scheme
to the asymmetric setting, as charm uses formally asymmetric groups. The assumptions
and the security proofs can be translated to the asymmetric setting in a generic way.
We consider a setting with three authorities and policies of size ten, where the decryption is always successful, and use oblivious list membership as our translation operation.
We present benchmarks for three operations. The first is the overall turnaround time of a
data query, i.e., the total time between a user’s initiation of a query and her receiving the
plaintext records that satisfy it. We also provide benchmarks for the encryption algorithm
and the key-generation algorithm, despite the fact that encryptions are done offline, and
key requests are significantly less frequent than data queries. Note that the hidden-accesspolicy feature is turned off in our experiments.
Recall that each data query entails the following steps. A query is sent to the CSP.
The CSP searches for all of the records that satisfy the query. For each ciphertext returned
by the search, the CSP sends its partial ciphertexts to the relevant proxies. Each proxy
obliviously translates the partial ciphertext it received. The user aggregates all partial
ciphertexts and decrypts the result to obtain the plaintext.
To enable adequate comparison of our OTABE scheme and other ABE schemes, results
are given for a single-record data query. Indeed, our running times are similar to other
multi-authority ABE schemes, such as [97]. When generalizing our results to the multirecord case, it is important to note that our scheme is highly parallelizable. No TA or proxy
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needs to coordinate its computation with any other TA or proxy; thus they can all proceed
in parallel. In order to decrypt, a data user must perform a separate computation for each
TA, and all of these computations can be done in parallel. Finally, partial ciphertexts that
correspond to different attributes can be translated in parallel.
Figure 4.2(e) compares the average time of a data query that contains 100 attributes,
for different numbers of mutable attributes and various sizes of ORGS . The runtimes
are relatively small: it takes only 314ms to perform a 90-translation data query when
|ORGS | = 10. Although there is an increase in runtime as the number of mutable attributes increases, this increase is significantly more noticeable when ORGS contains
fewer proxies. Figure 4.2(e) also demonstrates an inherent trade-off between the translation and decryption algorithms: A larger number of proxies results in better load balancing
of translation operations, but it also results in more expensive decryption.
Figure 2.1(b) shows the average time taken by the encryption algorithm for different
numbers of attributes in the ciphertext and various sizes of DECS . As expected, encryption time increases as the number of attributes in the ciphertext increases, and as the
number of organizations that participate in the decryption increases. Yet, as can be seen,
all times are very reasonable compared to other ABE schemes: it only takes 0.46s to encrypt a ciphertext that contains 100 attributes if the number of decrypting entities is 2, and
0.81s if the number of decrypting entities is 6. Bear in mind, that encryption is done once
per record, and offline.
Finally, Figure 2.1(c) shows the average time taken by the key generation algorithm
for various policies. The times are all under 1.81s. This means that, within less than
two seconds from a data user’s request for a task-related key, she will receive, from each
authority, a key that supports a policy of size 100. Bear in mind that key requests are
significantly less frequent than data queries and only occur once per time-limited task.
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2.10

The q-DBDH assumption

In Section 2.5, we define a q-type assumption, (q, t, n)-DBDTH, and use it to prove that
our OTABE scheme is secure. This assumption is based on another q-type assumption
(used in [96], as well as in other existing ABE works) that we referred to as the q-DBDH
assumption.
The q-DBDH assumption is parameterized by a security parameter λ, a suitably large
prime p, two prime-order bilinear groups G1 and G2, a bilinear map e : G1 → G2,
and an integer q. It is defined by a game between a challenger and an attacker. The
challenger picks a group element g uniformly at random from G1 and q + 3 exponents
x, y, z, b1 , b2 , . . . , bq independently and uniformly at random from Zp . Then it sends
(p, G1, G2, e) and the following terms to the attacker:
2

g, g x , g y , g z , g (xz)

∀l ∈ [q] : g bl , g xzbl , g xz/bl , g x
2

2 zb

2

l

2

, g y/bl , g y
2b

∀l, f ∈ [q], l 6= f : g ybl /bf , g xyzbl /bf , g (xz)

l /bf

2 /b2
l

, g xz(bl /bf )

The challenger flips a fair coin b. If b = 0, it gives the term e(g, g)xyz to the attacker.
Otherwise, it gives the attacker a term R chosen uniformly at random from G2. Finally,
the attacker outputs its guess b0 for the value of b.
We say that the q-DBDH assumption holds if all PPT attackers have at most a negligible advantage in λ in the above security game, where the advantage is defined as
Pr[b0 = b] − 1/2.
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Chapter 3
Social-network mining to infer voters’
intentions
3.1

Introduction

Political choices and voting decisions are considered by many people to be highly sensitive and private information that they are reluctant to reveal. Political campaigns, on
the other hand, are investing heavily in voter targeting, focusing intently on social network
platforms because of the micro-targeted advertising capabilities they provide. In this work,
we explore the following question: Can we predict the voting behavior of Facebook users
from their public Facebook profiles?
We present a novel approach for predicting the voting behavior of Facebook users using
a Bayesian-network model that combines demographic, behavioral and social features.
Although we focus on the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, our approach can be extended
to any two-part system.
This work is the first to use a Bayesian network model for political attribute inference.
Furthermore, it is the first to not only address, but also offer concrete solutions to the
selection bias problem, combining a representative and heterogeneous datasets of both
politically active and passive users, a semi-supervised training methodology and a diverse
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set of demographic, behavioral and social features. Finally, our model is trained to predict
not only to whom the user will vote, but also whether she will vote at all, a task that has
not been performed by any existing work on vote prediction.

3.1.1

Related work

There are several streams of research that investigate the predictive power of social media
for political purposes.
One stream of research concentrates on predicting the political orientation of an individual from various components of her social network profile: Tweets’ content [95];
retweet graph [29]; following behavior [14]; degree of tweets and retweets [22, 114]; and
“liking” politically oriented pages [19].
A more general approach, taken by [90, 111, 118, 120] aims at building a generic
framework for latent attribute inference of social media users. Those works do not focus on
political orientation as a stand-alone trait, but rather use it to demonstrate the functionality
of their generic classification system.
Another stream of research focuses on election prediction from social network data.
Such works usually take either a volume based approach or a sentiment analysis based
approach and use it to predict the outcomes of various election systems in both two-party
and multiparty settings [24, 74, 106, 108].
Although closely related to the lines of research discussed above, individual voting
behavior differs in several respects. Individual voting behavior prediction aims at predicting an individual choice (unlike election prediction, that aims at capturing an aggregated
measure) for a specific event. This event has a well-defined end date and a well-defined set
of choices (labels) that represent the possible voting choices the individual has in a given
election. In contrast, political orientation reflects a generic and subjective measure that
does not have well defined time boundaries; furthermore, the multitude of scales used for
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measuring political orientation, combined with the fact that any point on such scale may
have different meanings to different individuals results in the lack of a well-defined set of
labels.
In contrast to the work on political orientation and election prediction, relatively little
work has focused on individual voting behavior prediction: Gayo-Avello [43] tried to
infer the votes of Twitter users in the 2008 U.S. elections by applying multiple sentiment
analysis methods. Bachhuber et al. [13] examined several approaches aimed at finding
distinct clusters of Twitter users based on linguistic properties of their tweets, creating
language profiles for supporter groups in the 2016 US elections. Kristensen et al. [65]
used Facebook to predict voter intentions in the 2015 Danish election, and examined users’
political like history to predict which party will they vote for.

3.1.2

Shortcomings of prior research

A significant shortcoming of prior research is the use of biased datasets. Those datasets are
composed of politically active social-network users, a minority which does not represent
the ordinary user population. Classifiers trained on such datasets will thus experience
limited predictive accuracy when applied to ordinary users [28], who are less politically
engaged yet constitute the majority of social media users [85].
We recognize three potential sources of bias:
Platform: Twitter is the social network most commonly used for politically oriented
data-mining research. However, Twitter is one of the least representative social networks
[3, 80]: First, the usage statistics among American adults are quite low. Second, Twitter
users are not demographically representative of the population; the resulting demographic
bias is often ignored in research concerning political orientation inference and voting behavior prediction. Third, Twitter is considered the most “political” social network, attracting a user population with unusually high political awareness. Twitter users’ datasets
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are therefore highly likely to be politically and demographically unrepresentative of the
general population.
Features: The vast majority of prior work relies solely on the analysis of user-generated
content or politically oriented activities in social networks. This approach introduces substantial selection bias because the only social network users who appear in such datasets
are those who engage in politically overt activities, and only a minority of all users do
so [28], [65]. In other words, those approaches yield high-accuracy results, but those results are limited to a small fraction of social media users. Indeed, less than 27% of the
users in our dataset performed a public activity related to Trump or Clinton before the
2016 election date; that is, more than 73% of the users for whom solely relying on usergenerated content would yield results which are essentially no better than those we would
have received using a random classifier.
Labels: Previous works have used several methodologies for extracting labels from socialnetwork accounts, relying on online behaviors such as explicitly stating political orientation online [43, 90, 118]; including politically related content in tweets [13, 29, 114];
supporting partisan causes [95] or following candidates [110]. Subsequently, only users
for whom such label exists are included in the datasets, leading to the creation of biased
datasets, composed entirely of individuals who voluntarily disclose their political preference online. This methodology introduces self-selection bias into the final results, as users
who choose to disclose their political affiliations constitute a minority of social media
users[92].

3.1.3

Our contribution

The goal of the models presented in this work is the following: given a Facebook user,
predict the individual voting behavior of that user based on the public portions of the
user’s Facebook profile. Our main contributions are the following:
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Addressing sources of potential bias: we address platform-based bias by using Facebook
as our social network platform. Facebook is known to be much more representative of the
general population than Twitter and supports a richer profile representation; we address
features-based bias by going beyond active content analysis and combining multiple types
of information about the user: static (demographic attributes of the user), dynamic (activities performed by the user and their frequency patterns) and social (information we can
learn about the user from her social network links). Finally, we address label-based bias by
applying a semi-supervised approach that uses a combination of labeled data, where labels
are obtained from surveys, and unlabeled data, composed of users who didn’t participate
in the survey though were offered to.
Incorporating non-voters: Existing works implicitly assume that all users indeed vote.
That is, the only users that are included in the datasets are users who voted for one of the
candidates in a given election. This assumption is not only an unrealistic oversimplification of election systems but also prevents us from identifying important subpopulations,
whose specific vote is inconsistent with their general partisanship such as strong partisans
who decide not to vote in a given election. Our key assumption is that a voting decision
is influenced by two types of components: a “static” component that is determined by the
general party identification of the individual, and “dynamic” components that are determined by specific characteristics of the candidates and include both factual policy-related
material and subjective perception of the candidate. Each component can be learnt from
different elements in a social-network profile, and its influence on the individual’s voting
behavior is combined with the rest of the components using a Bayesian network model.
Using a novel Bayesian network model: Bayesian-network (BN) classifiers offer important advantages that specifically fit the nature of our problem as well as the nature of our
data.
One advantage of BNs is their ability to support the combination of data and prior
knowledge about the problem’s domain. This allows us to use existing research and statis79

tics for encoding some of the model’s parameters; these include interactions between demographic attributes, and interactions between demographic attributes and party identification. Another advantage of BNs is that they handle missing data very well within both
training and evidence data. This is particularly important when dealing with social network datasets, which are often incomplete. Indeed, datasets used in this work contain
a large number of missing values, which correspond to attributes that users have chosen
not to include in their public Facebook profile. Due to our use of BN, missing values
in the evidence data need not be imputed but rather can be fed directly to the model.
Furthermore, the probabilistic representation combines naturally with the ExpectationMaximization (EM) algorithm [31], enabling our training data to include both missing
values and latent variables. It is this trait of BNs that facilitates the use of both labeled and
unlabeled training data.

3.2

Methodology and datasets

We designed and distributed a comprehensive survey1 which adopted purposeful sampling
of eligible voters in the 2016 U.S. elections that are also Facebook users. We used the
Qualtrics survey platform to create and host the survey.
Survey construction: The survey included questions about the user’s demographics, her
Facebook activity, her political opinions including her party identification and her vote
in the 2016 presidential election. All survey data was anonymized after collection. We
informed participants that their responses would be used for academic research.
We implemented several methods for identifying and excluding data from participants
who answered unreliably. First, we eliminated responses from participants who took the
survey more than once. We took a conservative approach and discarded responses that
came from the same IP address. Second, to ensure the eligibility of participants, they had
1

The full survey can be found at https://lihiid.files.wordpress.com/2021/09/survey voting behavior.pdf
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to complete a screening questionnaire before taking the survey. The questionnaire was
carefully designed, in order to prevent respondents from inferring the qualifications we
were looking for and taking the survey without being an eligible participant. We avoided
yes/no questions regarding the qualification needed and used multiway questions instead,
as yes/no questions tend to insinuate the “correct” answer in order to pass the screening
questionnaire. In addition, we disguised the real screening questions among other dummy
questions. For example: instead of directly asking: “do you have a Facebook account”?
we asked a series of identical multiway questions about news consumption habits from
each of the media platforms. For example, the question “how often do you consume news
via TV?” had the following five answers: More than 5 times a day; 3 times a day; once
daily; Never; I do not have a TV. In the same question that dealt with Facebook, the last
answer was replaced by “I do not have a Facebook account”. Third, we included control
questions to ensure that the respondents were providing reliable data; those were fairly
straightforward questions which asked the same question multiple times, in different parts
of the survey, and using a slightly different terminology. We excluded participants who
failed in one or more of the control questions. Lastly, the survey’s name did not include
words such as ’politics’ or ’social media’ so as to not expose the qualifications needed, as
well as not to oversample from the more politically engaged population.
Datasets: In this work, we make use of three datasets:
D1 consists of 1638 survey responses collected via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk).
Labels for this dataset are obtained through the survey.
D2 consists of 841 Facebook profiles and corresponding survey responses collected
via both Facebook and Qualtrics. Labels for this dataset are obtained through the survey.
D3 consists of 500 unlabeled Facebook profiles, corresponding to individuals who did
not participate in our survey. The only information that was collected on this dataset is
public — details that the users have published in their public Facebook profile. For that
reason, D3 is unlabeled and contains a large number of missing features.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for D1 and D2
Attribute

Metric

D2

Gender

Female
Male
Post-graduate degree
College degree
No college degree
Married
Unmarried
Caucasian
African American
Hispanic
Other
Solid republican
Lean republican
Competitive
Lean democratic
Solid democratic
20-33
34-49
50+
Republican
Democrat
Independent
Trump
Clinton
Other

48.6%
51.4%
13%
35%
52%
48.9%
51.1%
66.6%
10.7%
15.6%
7.13%
28.3%
8.56%
38%
13.1%
12%
38.9%
30.2%
30.9%
33.9%
40%
26.2%
30.8%
36.7%
32.5%

Educational attainment

Marital Status
Ethnicity

State Of Residence

Age

Party Identification

Vote

D1

Census

50.6%
49.4%
14.3%
31.2%
54.5%
49.5%
50.5%
71.4%
9.77%
12.1%
6.72%
23.6%
10.5%
39.2%
14.6%
11.9%
53.7%
26%
20.3%
33.3%
33.3%
33.3%
32.1%
37.3%
30.6%

50.8%
49.2%
11%
26.2%
62.6%
48.3%
51.7%
62.8%
12.2%
16.9%
8.1%
24%
11.7%
40.5%
14.8%
9%
19.7%
20.5%
44%

The use of D1, D2 and D3 was motivated by our attempt to address three types of
selection bias:
Visibility bias: Datasets used in prior research were often created by systematically excluding users who did not publish a certain attribute — one that is crucial to the model’s
performance, such as politically oriented activity or self-reported label — in their public social network profile. Acknowledging that such approach yield datasets that are not
representative of the Facebook user population, our datasets were constructed so that the
absence of a feature or a label from a user’s public profile does not affect the user’s chance
of being selected. As is evident from Table 3.2, neither feature was publicly disclosed by
more than 46% of the users in D2, and only 4.4% of them published their vote in the 2016
presidential election.
Self-selection bias: D1 and D2 represent a population of individuals who have selected to
participate in our survey. In order to address this selection bias, we created a third dataset
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Figure 3.1: The BASIC model
D3 composed of Facebook users who, though were asked to, did not participate in our
survey. While we could not use D3 for testing, as it is unlabeled, we did combine it in our
training set in order to further generalize our model.
Demographic bias: one advantage of the use of MTurk for data collection is the ability
to obtain data from demographically diverse groups; although MTurk’s population is not
fully representative of the US population, the ease of data collection via MTurk enabled
us to reach crowds that are diverse across the primary demographic dimensions used in
this work. Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics of D1 and D2 and compares a subset of
their demographics to the 2014 US census. As can be seen, each group is well represented
in the datasets. Note that D1 was stratified by Party Identification, resulting in a balanced
representation of Republicans, Democrats, and Independents within the training set.
External software: Throughout this work we refer to specific subtasks that were performed using existing, readily available software. Examples include Genderize.io2 and
ethnicolr3 for gender and race inference based on the user’s name; Python NLTK for sentiment analysis tasks; GeNle and pysmile for our BNs’ creation, parameter learning, and
inference.
2
3

https://genderize.io/
https://ethnicolr.readthedocs.io/
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3.3

The Bayesian network

The target node in our BN, “vote”, represents the voting behavior of an individual user. It
may take one of three values: vote for candidate 0 (“c0”); vote for candidate 1 (“c1”); not
vote at all or vote for a third party candidate (“Other”). In our setting, “candidate 0” represents a vote for Donald Trump; “candidate 1” represents a vote for Hillary Clinton; “Other”
represents non voters or a vote for a third party candidate in the 2016 U.S. elections. The
basic idea behind our BN models is to treat the vote node as both a cause and an effect.
As such, it is influenced by a set of causes and causes a set of effects: Causes include
the party identification (PID) of the user and the voting behavior of the user’s network
neighborhood (NET). Effects include the user’s politically oriented activities on Facebook
(ACT). Each of the causes and effects belongs to a subnetwork that includes a different
type of observable variables: demographic attributes of the user (“static subnetwork”);
types and patterns of Facebook activity performed by the user (“dynamic subnetwork”);
and activities performed by the user’s network neighborhood (“social subnetwork”). Due
to the BN’s structure, we are able to elicit different priors with varying levels of confidence
to the different subnetworks.
Formally, given a target Facebook user ut , Let D = {Dt1 , Dt2 , . . . , Dtn } be n demographic attributes of ut , A = {A1t , A2t , . . . , Akt } be k attributes describing Facebook activities performed by ut and N = {Nt1 , Nt2 , . . . , Ntj } be j attributes describing ut ’s network
neighborhood. Given our target node, vote, we are interested in the label c that maximizes
the following posterior probability:

c=

argmax

P (vote = v | P ID, ACT, N ET )

v∈{c0,c1,Other}

Assuming that {Dt1 , Dt2 , . . . , Dtn }, {A1t , A2t , . . . , Akt } and {Nt1 , Nt2 , . . . , Ntj } are observable attributes, and using a bayesian approach P (ACT | A1t , A2t , . . . , Akt ),
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P (N ET | Nt1 , Nt2 , . . . , Ntj ) are obtained from our datasets and a uniform prior, and
P (P ID | Dt1 , Dt2 , . . . , Dtn ) is obtained from our datasets and survey-based, or censusbased priors.
Using the EM algorithm, we employed a two-stage learning methodology: first, we
trained a BN using the available labeled data (D1) and probabilistically labeled the unlabeled data; then, we trained a second BN using both the labeled data and a subset of the
unlabeled data (D3) about which the first BN was the most confident. This allowed us to
both learn the parameters of the model’s latent variables and diversify our training set with
a more representative, but unlabeled, data. Inference was done using a Junction tree based
algorithm.
Complexity-accuracy trade-off: the models presented in this work were carefully designed
so as to create compact models without damaging performance; if a certain edge did not
substantially contribute to the model’s predictive performance, we did not include it in
the network. For example, the income node in our SELF INFER model is, theoretically,
influenced by many demographic attributes. However, we have found that the only edges
that significantly contribute to the overall accuracy were those connecting income with
occupation, race and gender, and hence included only those edges in the network.
BASIC: Two nodes, “party identification” and “activity” are directly linked to the “vote”
node. “Party identification” covers the influence of an individual’s general party identification on her actual vote. It is considered an unobservable attribute, and thus inferred from
the user’s demographic attributes. The attributes which are included in the model met two
criteria: attributes which are highly indicative of party identification; observable attributes,
in the sense that they are either offered by Facebook as an optional field in a profile or can
be inferred from other public information, such as name. The following attributes were
included in our model: gender, age, race, state of residence, education level, marital status.
We enhance the static subnetwork using prior information about the magnitude of the
interactions between each demographic attribute and the PID. Priors are based on multiple
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surveys conducted by Pew research center4 and on statistics provided by the U.S. Census
Bureau; priors refer to data that was collected at least six months before the elections and
were incorporated into the model’s parameters using a Bayesian approach and a Dirichlet
prior with varying confidence factors based on the available prior information on a given
parameter.
As can be seen in Figure 3.1, the static subnetwork is built in a conceptually “layered”
fashion: The first level represents ascribed attributes; the second level represents acquired
attributes; the final level contains the PID node. In order to avoid a large CPT for the
PID node, we used a parent-divorcing technique, introducing intermediate nodes (colored
orange in Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3) that serve as the “accumulators” of the
PID given the subset of demographic attributes to which they are linked.
The second node which is directly linked to the target node is the “activity” node,
which addresses the more dynamic indicators of the user’s voting behavior and is influenced by the public Facebook activities that the user performs.
In BASIC, we included three types of activities: writing a post; sharing an item; and
“liking” a page that is positively or negatively associated with one of the candidates. Each
of those activities is represented in the model using a separate observable node. The “activity” node aggregates the different combinations of activities into three states that represent
the user’s overall activity: activity associated with supporting candidate 0, activity associated with supporting candidate 1 and activity that is not associated with supporting either
candidate (such as writing a positive post about both candidates).
REVISED: Our second model, the REVISED model, refines the dynamic subnetwork
(Figure 3.2) in order to reflect several insights we obtained from reviewing the explanations
respondents gave to different questions in the survey:
Positive activity towards a candidate and negative activity towards her opponent
are not equivalent: Although positive activities were almost always associated with a
4

https://www.pewresearch.org/
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Table 3.2: Fraction of users (D2) whose public profile contains various attributes
Attribute

Fraction revealed

Age
Educational attainment
Marital status
Occupation
State of residence
Wall content (full)
Wall content (partial)
Friends list
Activity (positive or negative)
associated with either Clinton or Trump
Vote in the 2016 Presidential election

18.2%
34.8%
36%
32.7%
45.5%
57.7%
72.5%
53.6%
26.6%
4.4%

vote for the candidate who was the subject of the activity, negative activities towards a
candidate were associated either with a vote for the candidate’s opponent, or with non
voters.
Passive users versus politically passive users: The respondents who answered that
they did not perform any political activities on Facebook were asked to explain why they
didn’t. A common explanation was an unwillingness to reveal political opinions on Facebook. It is important to note that those answers differed from the answers of respondents
who reported that they rarely use Facebook, use Facebook without performing activities,
or are simply not interested in politics. An interesting observation was that most users who
said they did not want to expose their political opinions on Facebook identified themselves
as either voted for Trump or did not vote at all.
Considering other Facebook activities: Respondents pointed out that, although they
have not performed an activity associated with one of the main candidates, they did perform an activity that was associated with a third-party candidate.
Based on our observations, we created the REVISED model: First, the “activity” node
was replaced with two nodes: “positive activity” and “negative activity”. In addition, the
observed “post”, “share”, and “like” nodes are each replaced by two nodes, one for the
positive form of the activity and one for the negative form of the activity. Note, that unlike
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the BASIC model in which there was no distinction between a positive activity towards
candidate x and a negative activity towards her opponent (as both were mapped to the same
“pro candidate x” state), here we distinguish between positive and negative activities, each
separately influences the vote node.
Second, we added a new binary node, labeled “Other activity”, that represents various
online activities that may indicate a vote for a third-party candidate. In the REVISED
model, it is set to one only if there is a positive activity associated with a third party
candidate in the user’s profile.
Third, we added a binary node, “activity level”, that represents the general activity
level of the user on Facebook. We wanted to distinguish those users who are not active on
Facebook from those who are not politically active on Facebook; our second observation
suggested that while the first group is not particularly important for the inference process,
the second group is strongly associated with users who voted for Trump (more generally,
with the candidate who is considered less “socially acceptable”). We added four questions to the survey: one asked for the subjective estimation, on a ten-point scale, of the
respondent’s activity volume on Facebook. The remaining three asked about the number
of posts, shares, and likes that the user has recently performed. We aggregated those four
measurements into one node, “activity level”, by discretizing each variable with a median
split and setting the “activity-level” value to the four variables’ logical AND.

3.4

Handling incomplete data

The models discussed thus far has considered a simplified setting, in which no evidence
data is missing. While social-networking services can potentially obtain such complete
information about their users (by accessing profile items in all visibility levels or collecting
demographic data when the user creates an account), third-party services can not, because
they are limited to the public portion of social-network profiles that often lacks some of
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the attributes that comprise our models’ features. Thus, it is essential to understand how
well does the model perform in the presence of missing data.
MISSING: In order to understand to what extent our model’s performance is influenced
by missing data, we tested the REVISED model on another dataset D0 2 which is identical
to D2 except for the following case: if the value of an attribute was not publicly shared
in a user’s Facebook profile, we deleted the attribute’s value from the user’s record in D0 2
and treated it as “missing evidence”. In other words, D0 2 includes only those attributes
that the users in D2 have chosen to publish under a “visible to everyone” setting. For
attributes that do not have their own field in a Facebook profile, such as race, we used
external software and inferred them from other public information such as name; if the
software misclassified the attribute (compared to the real label that was obtained from the
survey), we deleted it from D0 2.
Results for the MISSING model suggested a significant decrease in the overall accuracy, resulting in the need to design models that are specifically suited for missing evidence. The following models demonstrate several strategies that were used to handle the
challenge of incomplete datasets.
SELF INFER: This model enriches REVISED by exploring various correlations between
the input variables for the purpose of reducing the influence of missing data on the overall
results.
Interactions among demographic attributes: Instead of treating demographic attributes uniformly, we partition them into two groups: ascribed attributes and acquired
attributes. We can then make use of the possible dependency relations between the two
groups. This idea is incorporated in the model by creating new edges between the two “acquired” attributes, education level and marital status, and the “ascribed” attributes which
are known to be highly indicative of them: race, gender for the education level, and age,
gender for the marital status. An important advantage of this approach is the ability to
combine priors in the CPD of the demographic child nodes, which represent the known
89

Figure 3.2: The REVISED model
“influence” of the node’s parents on their descendant; the priors for this purpose were
taken from census statistics and were incorporated into the model’s parameters using a
Bayesian approach with a Dirichlet prior.
Hidden demographic attributes: Demographic attributes that were included in the
former models were both influential on the PID and observable, i.e., can be directly extracted from a Facebook profile. A question that may arise is whether both of those traits
must exist in a single attribute. The key idea is that while some observable attributes
are not highly influential on the PID, they are influential on other unobservable attributes
which do have a high influence on the PID. Using the chain of observable attribute →
unobservable attribute → PID we can combine such unobservable nodes in our model as
well.
We consider one such pair: occupation and personal income. While income is not a
“potentially observable” attribute on Facebook, it is highly indicative of the individual’s
PID. Occupation, on the other hand, is not considered very indicative of PID but can be
considered as an observable attribute. In the model shown in Figure 3.2, we incorporate
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Figure 3.3: The FULL model
this idea, introducing two new nodes: an observed occupation node and a hidden income
node. The latter is fed by three observed nodes: occupation, race and gender, and feeding
the PID node. The occupation node’s states represents the twenty main occupation categories according to the standard SOC (Standard Occupational Classification) system, to
which we added two additional states: “student” and “retired”.

3.5

Combining link information: The FULL model

Homophily is the tendency of individuals to link to others who are similar to them. In a social network setting, this principle implies that the network neighborhood of an individual
may reveal a significant amount of information about the individual. In the FULL model,
we adopt a fine-grained interpretation of the homophily principle in order to both enrich
the static subnetwork and create the social subnetwork.
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A common BN representation of social network ties [53, 61] relies on a user-based
granularity where each node corresponds to a user within the target user’s (ut ) neighborhood; in such representation, dependency relations (and, consequently, similarity relations) can only be established between users. Thus, such representation implicitly assumes
that if two users share a tie, all their traits are similar. As demonstrated by [79], this assumption is false: It is known that some attributes experience a more homophilous nature
than others. For some, similarity does not induce homophily at all.
In order to facilitate a more realistic representation of social network ties, our FULL
model relies on an attribute-based granularity, thus reflecting a more “fine-grained” homophily which may vary across different attributes. To achieve that, we decompose a user
into the different attributes that constitute her social network profile by associating nodes
with pairs of <user, attribute>, and dependency relations with links between attributes
of users. Using this fine-grained representation, dependency relations can be established
between a single attribute of ut and the same attribute of each of her neighbors only if the
attribute is known to be highly homophilous.
The above idea is implemented in the model using a small, fixed number of “aggregator” nodes (colored purple in Figure 3.3), thus avoiding the overhead of dynamically
allocating a separate node for each neighbor of ut . For a given attribute, those nodes aggregate the magnitude of each of the attribute’s states within ut ’s neighborhood: let at be
q(at )

an attribute of ut that we want to infer from ut ’s neighbors, and has q(at ) states, a1t ..at

.

In the BN, we allocate q(at ) aggregator nodes, parents of at , where the ith node represent
the magnitude of the subset of ut ’s neighbors for whom the value of at equals the state ait .

3.5.1

Enriching the static subnetwork

We use the homophily principle to infer missing demographic traits of ut from the Facebook profile of ut ’s neighbors.
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Table 3.3: Comparison of the overall classification accuracy using different training configurations.
TEST →
D2
D0 2
TRAIN ↓ BASELINE BASIC REVISED MISSING SELF INFER FULL
10-fold CV .382
.68
.745
.661
.718
.825
D1
.382
.726
.76
.67
.712
—
D1+D3
.382
.738
.782
.695
.755
—
FULL: In the FULL model (Figure 3.3), we focused on a particular subset of ties within
ut ’s network neighborhood. The subset is composed of neighbors who are ”close friends”
of ut , where a close friend is defined as a friend who has reacted to a recent post on
ut ’s wall. Using this approach, we only consider ties that are both intense and recent,
as the stronger the tie connecting two individuals, the more similar they are[48, 79].
Furthermore, such activity based metric is more predictive of tie strength than metrics
based on network structure or social distance, incorporating both intimacy and intensity
factors[44, 48]. The major advantage of this approach is its simplicity and practicality, as
it does not require access to the full list of friends, but only to ut ’s wall. Furthermore, such
ties can be identified and accessed directly from ut ’s profile.
We examined two attributes that are known to be highly homophilous: state of residence (SOR) and age. We elaborate on the CPD design of the state of residence node
(VSOR ). The CPD of the age node was built in a similar process.
The influence of ut ’s neighbors’ SOR on ut ’s own SOR is modeled using five aggregator nodes that represent the five states that the SOR variable can take in the BN (see
Table 3.1), {SORi }1≤i≤5 . The jth aggregator node quantifies the portion of ut ’s close
friends for whom VSOR =SORj . Each of the aggregator nodes was discretized to reflect
the rank of the state it represents among VSOR ’s states and was linked to VSOR as its parent
using a memory-efficient multinomial logistic CPD.
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3.5.2

Creating the social subnetwork

The influence of the target user’s neighborhood on her voting behavior has been considered thus far only indirectly, through the static subnetwork. A natural extension is to treat
the vote node as a stand-alone trait; then, the homophily principle can be used directly to
infer the voting behavior of ut from the voting behavior of her neighborhood. However,
because the voting behavior cannot be directly extracted from a Facebook profile field we
cannot use exact counts as we did for demographic attributes. Instead, we use an approximation of the overall voting behavior of ut ’s neighborhood, obtained via the following
procedure: First, we mark the subset of ut ’s neighborhood whose voting behavior can be
estimated with high confidence; these are users who have performed a social network activity that is associated with one of the candidates. Second, we determine the influence of
ut ’s neighborhood on her own voting behavior using only this marked subset, as well as
the magnitude of this subset relative to ut ’s neighborhood.
FULL: A social subnetwork, built under the same principles used to enhance the static
subnetwork, is added to the FULL model. The subnetwork contains four aggregator nodes,
representing the portion of ut ’s close friends who performed either a positive or negative
Facebook activity associated with candidate 0 or 1, and a “noise” node, representing the
portion of ut ’s close friends who did not perform any public Facebook activity associated
with a candidate. In order to avoid continuous-valued nodes, the portions represented by
each node were discretized into five intervals using equal-frequency discretization. All
four nodes were linked into one of two intermediate nodes (’Positive neighborhood activity’ and ’Negative neighborhood activity’), while the ’noise’ node was linked to both.
Those intermediate nodes aggregate the influence of the user’s neighborhood on her voting
behavior and feed directly to the vote node.
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3.6

Experimental results

The BASELINE, BASIC and REVISED models were evaluated on D2, which includes
attributes in all visibility levels. The REVISED model was also evaluated on D0 2, which
only includes attributes from D2 published under a “visible to everyone” setting. SELF
INFER and FULL, designed to handle missing evidence, were evaluated on D0 2.
Table 3.4 provides a detailed summary of results. We report overall accuracy, Precision, Recall, and AUC for each class. For FULL, we report the 10-fold cross-validation
results on D0 2, because D1 does not include social features. However, in order to take
advantage of the information in D1, we use the CPDs obtained for the static and dynamic
subnetwork in previous models as high-confidence priors for FULL.
Inspired by [90], we employ a simple baseline system (BASELINE) that classifies all
the users explicitly mentioning their vote in the 2016 election within one of their public
posts. All other users are considered misses for the given class.
Table 3.3 compares the overall accuracy of each model using different training configurations. The cross-validation results allow adequate comparison between the results
of FULL in Table 3.4 and the rest of the results. As can be seen, augmenting the labeled
dataset D1 with unlabeled data D3 indeed improves the classification accuracy. Furthermore, this increase becomes more significant as the number of missing values within the
test set increases.
BASELINE’s low overall accuracy probably results from the fact that very few users
have publicly disclosed their voting intention. Results for the REVISED model demonstrate an improvement over the BASIC model, especially for the “other” class. This improvement suggests that the finer-grained modeling of the dynamic subnetwork allows the
classifier to capture additional information which uniquely characterizes the “other” class,
thus better separating it from the other two classes. Results also show that the MISSING
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model underperforms the REVISED model. However, the differences are not as sharp as
we expected considering the large number of missing values.
FULL was the best model, as evidenced by its high accuracy score (82.5%). Its use
of social features boosts both precision and recall, but the SELF INFER model, which
only includes demographic and behavioral features, achieves a decent score (75.5%) as
well. This demonstrates the fact that using carefully designed models combined with
complementary sources of information about the user yields solid predictions even when
both training and testing datasets are incomplete.
Most determinant features: We performed a sensitivity analysis to assess the impact of
the various models’ features on our target variable, vote. We elaborate here on the two
most determinant features for each state of the vote node. The most influential feature
for vote=Trump was race=African American, which decreased the posterior probability
of vote=Trump by 19%, followed by positive neighborhood activity Trump=very high,
which increased the posterior probability of vote=Trump by 13%. For vote=Clinton, the
two most influential features were positive post=Clinton and education level=post graduate degree; they increased the posterior probability of vote=Clinton by 22% and 15%,
respectively. The two most influential features on vote=Other were negative activity=both
candidates and noise=very high. They increased the posterior probability of vote=Other
by 15% and 9%, respectively.
Comparison with Existing Results: Unlike political orientation, prediction of individual
voting behavior has not been intensively studied. Exceptions include [13], [43], and [65],
achieving an overall accuracy of 63%, 78.8%, 70.8% respectively. However, datasets used
in all three works were artificially limited to include only politically active users: users
who performed politically oriented tweets [13], hashtags [43] or likes [65]. The last is
highlighted because the accuracy of political-orientation classifiers is heavily dependent
on users’ political-engagement level. For example, [28] showed that methods for inferring the political orientation of social-network users previously claimed to achieve greater
96

Table 3.4: Detailed results for the Bayesian network models presented in this chapter
Model

Acc.

Class

Trump
BASIC
Clinton
Other
Trump
REVISED
Clinton
Other
Trump
MISSING
Clinton
Other
SELF INFER Trump
Clinton
Other
Trump
FULL
Clinton
Other

Prec.
.77
.72
.72
.73
.79
.83
.63
.75
.72
.69
.81
.76
.78
.83
.85

Rec.
.76
.89
.53
.85
.83
.64
.84
.7
.53
.87
.73
.65
.88
.86
.72

AUC
.91
.91
.78
.94
.92
.84
.88
.85
.78
.91
.88
.82
.94
.93
.91

.738

.782

.695

.755

.825

than 90% accuracy on politically active users, actually achieve barely 65% accuracy when
applied to “politically modest” users.
The prior work most relevant to ours is that of Kristensen et al. [65], which considers five models. We could not use all five as baselines for our work, because some use
features that can not be directly extracted from a Facebook profile (such as the user’s opinion towards politically dividing issues, information which [65] obtains from surveys). In
contrast, our main principle in this work is to only use features that can be extracted from
a Facebook profile directly, without requiring the user to participate actively in the datacollection process (our survey is used for validation purposes only). We were able to apply
model 2, which uses the user’s single most recent like that is associated with a party or
politician’s page; model 3, which uses the number of such likes over the past two years;
and their final model, which combines the features from model 3 with all the features from
the survey that served as their baseline model. We selected from their final model only
those features that can be extracted from a Facebook profile directly: gender, age, geog-
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raphy and education. All models were implemented using Python’s scikit-learn library.

0.85
0.8
0.75
0.7
0.65
0.6
0.55
0.5
BASIC

REVISED
SVM

MISSING
MNB

SELF INFER
BN

FULL

BDT

Figure 3.4: Overall classification accuracy among different classifiers
Applying model 2 to our dataset (Using D1 and D2 as training and test sets) achieved
an overall accuracy of 38.6%, a low score both compared to the result achieved in [65]
(43.9%) and to our BN models’ results. Applying model 3 to our dataset achieved an
overall accuracy of 40.4%. It is interesting to see that there is not much improvement in
the accuracy compared to model 2, while the difference between the two models in [65]
is more significant, with model 3 achieving 60.9%. Finally, applying their final model
to our dataset achieved an overall accuracy of 60%; we can see a clear increase in the
accuracy compared to models 2 and 3; however, it still underperforms [65]’s final results
(70.8%). This results from the fact that [65] both artificially limit their datasets to users
who performed a “political like” (only 19% from our dataset) and use features that can
not be directly extracted from a user’s profile such as opinion about politically dividing
issues. As evidenced by Table 3.4, [65]’s final model significantly underperforms all our
BN models when applied to our datasets. This highlights the added value that BNs have for
this specific task compared to a regression model, and the importance of the other features
that are not included in [65]’s final model but are included in our BN models.
Apart from [65], no other existing work could serve as a proper baseline for our work,
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primarily because their objective is different from ours; Unlike works such as [74, 106],
we are not trying to forecast the general outcome of an election. Unlike works such as
[28, 29, 90, 118], we are not trying to predict a general political orientation of an individual. Therefore, a direct comparison of our results and theirs is meaningless. For
election forecasting, such comparison is impossible since the evaluation metrics are different: while we use an overall accuracy score, election prediction papers use MSE and
compare their forecasting results to national surveys. Furthermore, the vast majority of
political orientation inference papers have dealt with Twitter; thus, their models heavily
rely on Twitter-specific features, making it impossible to apply those models directly to
our datasets. However, in order to gain further insights about how our BN compares to
other models used in previous work, we chose two other classifiers commonly used in
previous work on political orientation inference: Support Vector Machines (SVM) and
Boosted Decision Trees (BDT), as well as simplified Multinomial Naive Bayes (MNB)
classifier, and tested the performance of each classifier when applied to our datasets and
fed with the features of each of our BN models.
Hyperparameters (cost and γ for the RBF SVM; number of trees and learning rate
for BDT) were chosen using a randomized grid search with 5-fold cross-validation. All
three models were implemented using Python’s scikit-learn library. As seen in Figure 3.4,
both MNB and SVM considerably underperform the BN on all five configurations. On the
other hand, the BDT classifier performs on par with the BN; it slightly outperforms the
BN on the REVISED model but underperforms the BN on the MISSING, SELF-INFER
and FULL models; that is, when the test set contains missing evidence.
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Chapter 4
Inferring behavioral intentions of
social-network users
4.1

Introduction

Knowledge of SN users’ decisions and intentions has immense potential to improve the
design of recommendation systems, ad-targeting mechanisms, public-health campaigns,
and other social and commercial endeavors. At the same time, such knowledge can have a
detrimental effect on users’ privacy. In this work, we are interested in inferring intentions
of SN users using public data extracted from their SN accounts.
Problem description: Let u be an SN user and Su be the set of SNs on which u has
accounts. We use ξ(u,s) to denote user u’s account on network s. Each account has a private
pr
pu
portion ξ(u,s)
and a public portion ξ(u,s)
. The private portion contains data that only u’s ties

and the SN provider can see, while the public portion contains data that can be seen by
pu
everyone. In addition to data that u publishes, ξ(u,s)
contains metadata information about

ξ(u,s) such as the mere existence of ξ(u,s) and the visibility levels of different attributes
in ξ(u,s) . The goal of this work is to infer an SN user u’s offline intentions using only the
pu
public portions, {ξ(u,s)
}s∈Su , of her online SN accounts. We focus on present or near-future

behavioral intentions, i.e., on decisions to perform certain actions within short periods of
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time after the decisions are made. Examples include weight-loss intentions, vaccination
intentions and purchase intentions.
As intention inference is a complex task, combining external, internal and temporal
factors, we tackle it in two stages: First, we propose a novel methodology for inferring behavioral attributes such as decisions and intentions. We go beyond the inference
of single attributes and design a modular Bayesian-Network model that, using public SN
data, aims at inferring different types of intentions in different domains. We then build
on this general-purpose model and use it to create intention-specific Dynamic Bayesian
Networks. Because of their temporal nature, DBNs can capture the evolving nature of the
decision-making process. The work makes the following contributions:
Intention inference: Intention inference differs from the inference of other attributes in
multiple respects. Unlike persisting attributes such as personality traits or attitudes, intentions are dynamic in the sense that their values with respect to a given user may constantly
change. Unlike attributes such as mental state or demographic attributes, intentions are
“self-controlled” attributes, in the sense that the user is able to control the values of those
attributes. The intentions that we explore in this work can be seen as “behavioral” attributes, as they aim at predicting a time-varying behavior rather than a time-invariant
tendency, opinion or preference. Intentions are therefore significantly harder to infer than
other extensively researched attributes.
A new methodology for intention inference: We present a modular model that draws
on behavioral-psychology literature and can be used to infer different different types of
intentions in different domains. Our Bayesian-Network-based models are built using a
sophisticated, hybrid feature-selection method and can handle common challenges in SN
research such as incomplete datasets and bidirectional influence between features and the
target variable.
A novel DBN representation of SN users: We offer a new conceptual model of SN users
that is particularly suited for inference of dynamic attributes. Each user u is modeled
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Figure 4.1: Our general intention-inference model.
using a set of DBNs, {Dud }. Each DBN Dud=k aims at inferring or predicting a different
dynamic attribute of u, k. Users’ SN profiles are sampled at regular intervals; the resulting
data is fed into each attribute-specific DBN Duk and is used, along with data sampled in
prior time slots, for the inference of k’s current value. We demonstrate our approach when
applied to the inference of various intentions using temporal SN data collected in multiple
waves. This work is the first to take a DBN-based approach to the SN-attribute-inference
problem.
Finally, We evaluate our new DBN-based SN-users representation using five intentions: vaccination intentions, weight-loss intentions, purchase intentions, borrowing intentions and job-searching intentions, achieving varying, yet promising results despite the
use of highly imbalanced, incomplete datasets.
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4.2
4.2.1

Methodology
Key ideas

We start by clarifying the terminology used in this chapter. The terms “decision” and “intention” are sometimes mistakenly used to describe a past behavior, rather than a cognitive
state. This work does not aim at predicting past behaviors, but rather the decision to perform those behaviors. Identifying the specific cognitive stage that lies between planning
an action and performing that action is of utmost importance for many applications, such
as recommendation systems and targeted advertising. Therefore, in this work we will use
the term “behavioral intention” to describe a decision to perform a present or near-future
behavior.
“Intentions are people’s decisions to perform particular actions” [103]. In this work,
we aim at understanding to what extent we can infer behavioral intentions of SN users.
In order to do that, we build a Bayesian-Network model that is based on intentions’ most
influential factors as shown in behavioral psychology literature [39, 52, 103]. We split
those factors into two groups: static factors, such as personality, demographic attributes
and self-efficacy, and dynamic factors such as emotions, situational factors, interest and
opinions. While those factors are known to be excellent determinants of behavioral intentions, the values of some of them (personality, for instance) can not be directly obtained
from the user’s SN profile (“latent variables”). Therefore, we enrich the model with various observed or partially observed network features which may assist in both inferring the
target intention and inferring each intention’s latent determinants.
Though different intentions are assumed to be influenced by the same high-level factors, their associated BNs still differ in their qualitative, quantitative and temporal specifications. To reflect those differences, we build on our general intention-inference BN and
create, for each behavioral intention, an intention-specific DBN. This is achieved using a
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multistage process: first, intention-specific predictors are obtained from relevant literature
and added to the set of general features as described above. Second, the final feature set
of each intention is determined using priors, feature-selection methods, or both. Third, the
set of intention-specific features is mapped into network nodes; this includes aggregation,
state-elicitation and discretization strategy. Fourth, the structure of each intention-specific
DBN is specified using priors, structure-learning methods, or both. Lastly, The DBN’s
parameters are quantified using a combination of prior information and data.
In order to simplify the models’ description, they are specified in a gradual manner:
in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 we show how to implement the above methodology using static
BNs and in Section 4.5 we elaborate on the process of extending the resulting BNs and
creating intention-specific DBNs. In Section 4.6, we present our models’ results when
used for the inference of various intentions: weight-loss intentions (WI), vaccination intentions (VI), travel-purchase intentions (PI), borrowing intentions (BI) and job-searching
intentions (JI).

4.2.2

Data collection

We designed and distributed a comprehensive survey1 created and hosted using Qualtrics
survey platform. The first part of our survey contained questions about the participants’
personal attributes, as discussed in Section 4.3. The second part contained the following
statements, which users were asked to rank (as well as dummy statements about unrelated
intentions): “I am planning to start a weight-loss regime within the next 1-4 weeks” and
“I am currently trying to lose weight” (weight-loss intentions); “I am planning to look
for a new job within the next 1-4 weeks” and “I am currently looking for a new job”
(job-searching intentions); “I am planning to apply for a loan within the next 1-4 weeks”
(borrowing intentions); “I received a flu vaccine this season” — depending on the answer
1

The full survey can be found at https://lihiid.files.wordpress.com/2021/09/survey behavioral intentions.pdf
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to that question the following question was asked for either the upcoming (2020-2021) flu
season or the next season (2021-2022): “I am planning to get vaccinated against influenza
this upcoming fall-winter/next year” (vaccination intentions); “I am planning to make a
travel-related purchase within the next 1-4 weeks” (travel-purchase intentions). Ambiguous words and phrases such as ”travel-related purchase” and ”weight-loss regime” were
explained to the participants.
We implemented several methods for identifying and excluding data from participants
who answered unreliably, as extensively discussed in Chapter 3. All survey data was
anonymized after collection. We informed participants that their responses would be used
for academic research.
Table 4.1: Datasets’ statistics
1st-wave dataset
2nd-wave dataset

Size
1300
803

%VI
58
66

%WI
38
40

%BI
17
13

%PI
24
19

%JI
19
23

Datasets: Survey data was collected in two waves with a three-month lag. Training and
test datasets include data obtained from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), Facebook
(profile attributes and activities), Instagram (profile attributes and activities) and Linkedin
(only profile attributes). MTurk participants were presented with two options: providing
links to their SN profiles (which they reported having in the screening step), or answering
a series of questions about their SN profiles; providing SN links was optional and completely voluntary. We took a wide and shallow approach: while data was gathered from
multiple SN accounts of each target user, we did not collect “deep” network information.
Therefore, our datasets do not include information about the target user’s SN ties, except
for information that can be directly extracted from the target user’s SN accounts such as
the number of user’s SN ties (see Section 4.3).
As in [57], our datasets include both labeled and unlabeled data; unlabeled data is
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specifically important when using multi-wave data, as a considerable number of participants dropped out after the first wave: from 1300 respondents who participated in our
first-wave survey, only 803 participated in our second-wave survey (0.617 response rate).
In order to both reduce non-response bias and create a bigger training dataset, we chose a
subset of our partially-labeled data records which belong to participants who dropped out
(missing attributes were treated as missing values) and added it to our training set (see Section 4.5). Our training datasets, Dj1 (first-wave data for intention j) and Dj2 (second-wave
data for intention j) consist of 780 and 592 labeled and unlabeled data records, respectively. Our test sets, Dj3 (first wave-data for intention j) and Dj4 (second-wave data for
intention j) consist of 520 and 361 labeled data records, respectively. As mentioned in
Section 4.1, in order to simulate a real-world inference task we only consider the public
portion of each user’s online SN profiles. Therefore, each dataset contains a large number
of missing values which corresponds to attributes that the user has not publicly revealed
on one of her SN accounts. The size of our datasets is similar to datasets used in prior
work in which labels are obtained using surveys or others means that require the users’
active participation (unlike self-reported labels). Examples include [60] (523), [29] (956),
[65] (1216), [118] (400), [30] (1583), [46] (279), [105] (53).

4.3

Features

A template of our general intention-inference model is shown in Figure 4.1. Second
layer-third-layer edges and first-layer-third-layer edges are not presented, because they
are intention-specific and must be determined separately for each behavioral intention.
Likewise, double-sided edges represent scenarios in which influence may flow in different
directions, depending on the inferred intention. Bold nodes are translated into multiple
nodes in each intention-specific model.
To reduce noise when combining high dimensional features, and to avoid a large con-
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ditional probability table (cpt), we used a layering-divorcing technique. Our basic idea
was to create a “layered” network. The first (inner) layer comprises the target intention
node that we aim at inferring (colored green in Figure 4.1). The second layer comprises
either latent or partially observed nodes, obtained using prior research (colored orange in
Figure 4.1). Those nodes represent external and internal factors that are known to have a
strong relation to the formation of behavioral intentions. The third layer consists of observable network features (colored purple in Figure 4.1). The purpose that they serve is
twofold: both to assist in inferring the behavioral intention, and serve as observed predictors for second layer’s latent variables. While some prior research exists on relations
between network features and behavioral intentions, it is both relatively sparse, and not
general enough. Therefore the decision of which network features to include in each BN
was made primarily on the basis of feature-selection results. Some of the network features
were found to directly influence the behavioral intention (first layer), and were therefore
included in the second layer as well.

4.3.1

Second-layer features

Training-set values for second-layer variables were obtained from our survey. We elaborate on our survey questions for non-trivial attributes. Test-set values were either obtained
or inferred using network features as discussed in Subsection 4.3.2.
Personality: This variable represents five broad dimensions of personality obtained from
the “Big Five” model of personality dimensions. The big five model distills personality
to five traits: neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and ‘openness
to experience’. To measure the Big Five personality traits among survey participants we
used a short version of the Big Five Inventory based on BFI-10 [94].
Demographic attributes: We considered the following demographic attributes: age, gender, ethnicity, marital status, occupation group, income (latent variable). Only a subset of
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those attributes were used in each model.
Situational variables: Events that might trigger a certain behavioral intention. Those
events include personal-life transitions, professional-life transitions, external events (such
as a holiday or an election), etc. Priors were obtained for some events-intentions relations. For instance, life-transitions are shown to have an important impact on weight-loss
intentions [23].
Emotions: Our model should represent the fact that different emotions may serve as either the cause of a behavioral intention or as its effect. Therefore, we went beyond the
binary emotion-representation (positive-negative) and also considered fine-grained emotions. The most studied model of discrete emotions is the Ekman model [34] which posits
the existence of six basic emotions: anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness and surprise. Since
momentary emotion ratings are not particularly indicative of the behavioral intentions explored in this work, survey participants were presented with eight emotion categories (six
basic emotions and two positive-negative emotion categories) and were asked to rate their
feelings over their past week/month/three months in general.
Interest, Opinion: Those variables represent the user’s level of interest and opinion regarding topics related to a given behavioral intention.
Intention-specific features: Apart from the set of general features as discussed above, we
also consider several intention-specific predictors that are known to be strongly linked to
different intentions such as body image (weight-loss intentions) [78], impulsivity (borrowing intentions) [89], employment status (“status” in Figure 4.2), etc.

4.3.2

Network features

We considered a diverse set of network features. The values of a given network feature
were included in our datasets if and only if this network feature was part of the public
portion of one of the user’s SN profiles.
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Numeric features (NUMERIC): We considered statistics about the user’s activity (number of posts, status updates, number of uploaded photos, etc), reactions to the user’s content (number of tagged photos, for instance) and the user’s reactions to other users’ content. The latter measure was sparse, as both Facebook and Instagram limit the visibility of
such reactions. We also considered basic statistics about the users’ network, but we limit
ourselves to statistics that are both publicly visible and can be directly extracted from the
user’s own SN profile/s (number of friends, followers-following ratio, etc).
Raw Textual features (TEXT): Textual features were classified as either user-generated
(UG) features (including textual content that was written by the user), or non-user-generated
(NUG) features (textual features that were not written by the user such as likes (Facebook)
or hashtags (Instagram)). We limit ourselves to textual content that is both publicly visible
and was either produced by the target user, or can be directly extracted from the user’s own
SN profile/s.
Miscellaneous features (MISC): Miscellaneous features include features that are neither
numeric nor textual, such as the mere existence of various SN accounts, visibility level/s
that the user has chosen to apply to her SN accounts, profile attributes from which demographic attributes can be extracted, etc. MISC features can be seen as SN accounts’
metadata rather than the data itself (NUMERIC, TEXT).

4.3.3

Linguistic features

Keyword-search (KWS-UG, KWS-NUG): For a given intention, or an event, A, we manually identified the most prominent keywords related to A. We then performed a keyword
search on our textual features. For some textual features, items that were found to contain a relevant keyword were further processed using a second method, depending on the
nature of A and the nature of the textual feature. This resulted in two groups of features,
KWS-UG (keyword search applied to user-generated content) and KWC-NUG (keyword
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search applied to non-user-generated content).
LIWC (LIWC-UG, LIWC-NUG): LIWC is a text analysis tool that is widely used in
psychological studies [107]. Each list of words is associated with a semantic or syntactic
category, such as positive emotion, adverbs or tone. LIWC analysis was applied to both
UG and NUG textual features. However, with regards to NUG features, we only considered a relatively small subset of LIWC categories that mostly deal with features’ topics,
such as leisure, work, money or sentiment.
Topic modeling (LDA-UG, LDA-NUG): Topics were extracted using Latent Dirichlet
Allocation (LDA). Shorter features (such as likes) and longer features (such as posts) were
considered separately using different parameters. As many likes only contain names (e.g
brand names), we considered a like to be both the like’s title as well as the category to
which it belongs.
Sentiment analysis, part-of-speech tagging (SA, PoS): These were only applied to KWSUG (SA and PoS) and KWS-NUG (SA), i.e., textual features that were found to contain at
least one relevant keyword. SA was applied to items that were found to contain keywords
that relate to the behavioral intention to be inferred, in order to assess the user’s opinion
on topics related to the behavioral intention. The use of PoS tagging was more implicit,
and was applied to items that were found to contain keywords that relate to events.
Emotions (NRC, LIWC): We automatically quantify emotions from our UG textual features using LIWC and NRC. NRC is a publicly available lexicon of words associated with
any of the six emotions, as well as general positive and negative sentiment [82]. We assign
a predicted emotion to each UG textual feature and then average across all users’ features.
Network representation: The features described in this section were first fed into our feature selection algorithm (Section 4.4). Only features that were found to be relevant for
the inference of a given intention were included as nodes in the intention’s BN. Nodes
in our BNs represent either discretized values of numeric features; categorical features
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such as demographic attributes; or discretized frequencies of various categories of a certain linguistic feature; such nodes are essentially aggregators as their value represents the
prevalence of a specific linguistic category among the entire set of a user’s raw textual
features. For instance, a node may represent “the aggregated portion of textual features
that contain keywords related to fitness”. Finally, situational variables are connected to the
target node through an intermediate node, “trigger event”.

4.4

Feature selection and model selection

Feature selection: We designed a two-level, hybrid feature-selection (FS) method. Due to
the high number of correlations between different features, we opted for a BN-based-FS
method that utilizes a BN-learning algorithm rather than a univariate filter-based approach.
However, performing FS using only a BN may lead to overfitting. In addition, the vast
majority of BN-learning algorithms require complete datasets. To combine the best of
both worlds, we employed a hybrid FS approach. First, a simple, univariate FS method
was applied to a subset of the features on which we didn’t have strong prior information.
For that purpose, we used a mutual information-based FS method and removed all the
features that received a score below a certain threshold. Mutual information measures the
dependency between variables (specifically, between each feature and the target variable)
and is thus highly suited for BN-based models. The resulting features, as well as the set
of latent/high-prior features were the input for the second phase which used the Greedy
Thick Thinning learning algorithm (GTT) [27]. This phase aimed at identifying the best
features using Markov Blankets.
A Markov Blanket of a variable t is a minimal variable subset conditioned on which
all other variables are probabilistically independent of t. The Markov Blanket of a BN
node, M B(t) is the set of its parents, P (t); children, C(t); and spouses, U (t) (i.e., parents
of common children) as encoded by the graph structure of the BN. As shown in [64], the
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Markov Blanket of a given target variable is the theoretically optimal set of variables to
predict its value. However, simply considering all the features in the Markov Blanket of
the behavioral intention node is unsatisfactory in our case, due to the existence of latent
variables. Thus, a better strategy would be to first find an “approximated” Markov Blanket
of the target node, M B 0 (t) which includes the variables in the sets P (t), C(t) and U (t) as
discussed above. Then, identify the Markov Blanket of each latent variable that is also a
member of the target’s approximated Markov Blanket and include the features in the union
of those blankets in our feature set (in addition, of course, to features in M B 0 (t)). That is,
our feature set is:
{M B 0 (t)} ∪ {M B(I) | I ∈ S ∩ M B 0 (t)}
Where S represents the set of latent variables in our model. The above strategy would
have probably been sufficient if our datasets were complete. However, our datasets contain
missing values which had to be imputed before running the SL algorithm. We note that
although one of the main strengths of BNs is the ability to perform parameter learning and
inference in the presence of missing values, most of the BN-structure-learning algorithms
require complete datasets. Hence, for some variables we consider an “extended” notion
of a Markov Blanket which also includes certain variables that belong to the variable’s
second-degree Markov Blanket. Specifically, if a given variable v represents an observed
attribute with more than 50% missing values in our test sets (m()) and for which we do
not have a strong prior (p()), we consider a restricted notion of v’s second degree Markov
Blanket, and add both its direct parents P (v) and its direct children C(v) to our feature
set. Let F be that entire variable-set before applying feature selection, and O the set F \ S;
that is, the set of observed variables (many of which are only partially observed). Our final
feature set includes the following features:
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{M B 0 (t)} ∪ {M B(I) | I ∈ S ∩ M B 0 (t)} ∪
{P (I) | I ∈ O ∩ M B 0 (t) ∧ m(I) > 50% ∧ p(I) = f alse} ∪
{C(I) | I ∈ O ∩ M B 0 (t) ∧ m(I) > 50% ∧ p(I) = f alse}
Structure learning (SL): Using the GTT learning algorithm, the approach described
above not only yields a feature set but also a BN structure (by considering all the nodes in
the feature set and all the edges connecting features in the feature set). A small number of
edges were corrected in order to reflect strong prior information.

4.5

Moving from static to dynamic models

So far, we have treated intentions as time-invariant attributes using a static BN. Decisionmaking, however, is a dynamic process. Thus, a temporal model should be used; one
that can capture temporal relations between different variables and our target behavioral
intention. Using a DBN, not only can we model temporal relations between different
variables and each behavioral intention, but also model both static and temporal relations
among different variables.
A DBN is a sequence of BNs. Each BN represents a time slice of the DBN, i ∈ T ,
corresponding to a particular instance of time. A DBN adds three components to a static
BN: temporal variables, temporal edges and temporal evidence. For instance, if a static BN
contains the variables {X j }j∈D , a DBN may also contain variables that can take different
values in different time slices, e.g. {Xij }j∈D,i∈T . In order to build a DBN we must specify
both its intra-slice structure and corresponding cpts (as in BNs) and its inter-slice cpts.
Intra-slice cpts represent dependency relations within a specific time slice. Inter-slice cpts
represent temporal dependency relations; that is, relations between variables from different
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(a) Vaccination intentions

(b) Purchase intentions

(d) Weight-loss intentions

(c) Borrowing intentions

(e) Job-searching intentions

Figure 4.2: A DBN representation of various intentions.
time slices.
Formally, a DBN is defined as a pair (B0 , Bt ) where B0 defines the prior P (X1 ) and Bt
is a two-slice temporal BN that defines P (Xi |Xi−1 ) by means of a directed acyclic graph:

P (Xi |Xi−1 ) =

Y

P (Xij | P A(Xij ))

j∈D

If P A(Xij ) (Xij ’s parents in the network) only contains variables from either the same
time slice or an immediate previous time slice, the DBN is considered a first-order DBN.
The temporal nature of DBNs, combined with other unique features such as their ability to work on incomplete datasets make DBNs highly suited for representing various SN
components. In this work we focus on SN users, and apply a user-centric approach in
which each SN user u is represented as a set of DBNs, {Dud }. Each DBN Dud=k corresponds to a different dynamic attribute, k; after it is built and trained, Duk can be used to
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infer the value of k, using data that is sampled at regular intervals from u’s SN profiles.
DBNs are extremely versatile; once a DBN Duk is built and trained, it can be used to
conduct various types of analysis. This includes inferring k’s current values, predicting
its future values, identifying key determinants of k and performing backward reasoning
and retroactive analysis of historical values. A particularly useful feature of DBNs is the
ability to assess how a given dynamic attribute changes over time. This ability can be used,
for instance, by advertisers in order to assess the impact of a given targeted campaign on
the users’ intentions.
We demonstrate our approach using the five intentions considered in this work. For
each intention, we build its own DBN which builds on the static model developed in previous sections. Note that in this work data is sampled twice, at the same sampling rate
for all the intentions. However, if time allows and enough resources are available, better
results can be achieved when sampling each SN multiple times using sampling rates that
are uniquely tailored to each intention.
In order to define the inter-slice structure of each intention-specific DBN, the following
components must be specified:
Temporal/static nodes: The set of static and temporal nodes. Some nodes, such as emotions, are inherently temporal (colored yellow/green in Figure 4.2). Other nodes, such as
gender, are static (colored pink in Figure 4.2). For some nodes, their static/temporal definition depends on the sampling rate of the network with regards to a given attribute. Note
that some variables that were considered static in our BN are latent attributes, and thus represent the approximated value of those attributes. This approximation may be dynamically
updated based on temporal evidence that is added in each time slot.
Inter-slice structure: Dependency relations between a subset of each DBN’s temporal
nodes that belong to different time slices. As we only considered a first-order model, it
can be assumed that temporal relations may only include edges between two consecutive
time slices. However, in higher-order models inter-slice relations may include other types
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of edges as well. In fact, including historical values for some variables can be very useful
for the inference of certain intentions. The inter-slice structure of each DBN was obtained
using a combination of priors and data using a SL algorithm similar to the one described
in Section 4.4.
Figure 4.2 presents our intention-specific DBNs. For simplicity, we omit network-level
features.
As can be seen, a temporal link is created between variables that represent our target
intentions in consecutive time slices. P (intentioni+1 | intentioni , U ) represents the intention’s evolution over time, given changes in other temporal variables in the network
(U ).
Interest-intention is an interesting relation. First, we see that interest may serve as
either a cause or an effect of different intentions. Second, interest seems to be a cyclic process, to some extent, as can be concluded from P (W Ii | interesti , U ) and P (interesti+1 |
W Ii ), for example. Such a temporal relation might be attributed to the fact that interest
in a certain topic assists in forming a behavioral intention related to that topic. After the
intention has been formed, a new level of interest is formed, aimed at understanding how
to fulfill that intention. In addition, P (P Ii+1 | interesti , U ) and P (interesti+1 | P Ii+1 )
show that both prior interest-level and current interest-level are important determinants
of some intentions. In higher-order models, such a dependency relation might also include older interest levels. Such historical data can assist in identifying a sudden increase
in the user’s interest level.
“Opinion” is another interesting variable. An opinion might be influenced by multiple factors such as personality traits and demographic attributes as demonstrated by VI’s
P (opinioni+1 | opinioni , education, age, personality). Note that this cpt also contains
opinioni . This represents the fact that oftentimes, opinion is a self-propelling process:
opinion at a given point in time, in addition to other factors, influences opinion at future
points in time. A similar cpt structure is seen in “COVID-19 concern”.
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Fine-grained emotions were not used in either of the models. Furthermore, we weren’t
able to extract from the data meaningful inter-slice relations between different fine-grained
emotions and the target intentions. We attribute that difficulty to the fact that unlike
other features, emotions change quickly. Thus understanding emotions’ temporal evolvement mechanism for each intention requires the use of finer-grained sampling rates.
Parameter learning: parameter learning was performed using the Expectation-Maximization
algorithm [31]. This allowed us to use the original, incomplete training dataset. Our belief was that since our test datasets include a large number of missing values, training the
DBN on incomplete datasets will allow the BN to take into consideration relations between missing and observed values of different features in different records, thus allowing
the network to generalize better. Parameter learning was done in two stages: first, we
trained a DBN using our labeled training data and probabilistically labeled the unlabeled
training data; then, we trained a second DBN using both the labeled data and a subset of
the unlabeled data on which the first DBN was the most confident. This semi-supervised
approach allowed us to incorporate unlabeled data in the training process as well to reduce
selection and visibility bias.
After each DBN is built and trained, it can be used to perform different kinds of inference and prediction by periodically sampling users’ SN profiles, using the sampled data
as temporal values for the temporal nodes in the DBN and running an inference algorithm.
In this work, we used the Lauritzen-Spiegelhalter’s junction tree algorithm [69], applied
to incomplete test sets. In the next section, we show our inference results when using a
two-slice DBN and SN data sampled twice.

4.6

Results

For a given intention j we tested its DBN DBNj using our datasets as follows: in the
first stage, (1), we trained DBNj using Dj1 and tested it on Dj3 . Only the first DBN’s slice
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Table 4.2: Results of the DBN models presented in this chapter
Intention
Micro F1, (1)
Macro F1, (1)
Micro F1, (2)
Macro F1, (2)

VI
.732
.73
.75
.741

WI
.832
.815
.831
.82

BI
.663
.54
.662
.526

PI
.763
.691
.812
.732

JI
.704
.623
.747
.699

was affected in this stage. In the second stage, (2), we trained DBNj using Dj2 (implicitly
using Dj1 as well due to the use of priors) and tested it on Dj4 , using evidence data from
Dj3 as well. Hence, inference results in (2) were obtained based on data and parameters
from two slices of the DBN. The idea behind our approach was to simulate a real-world
scenario in which SN data is sampled multiple times at different points. In such cases,
all the data collected up to time t can be used as evidence to infer the target intention at
time t (and predict it at time t0 , t0 > t). Note that our test sets are highly imbalanced, in
order to accurately represent the original distribution of each intention within our collected
datasets (Table 4.1). Moreover, as we only consider the public portion of SN profiles, our
datasets contain a large number of missing values. Those facts make the inference task
highly challenging, both as a stand-alone task and compared to inference tasks in prior
attribute-inference works.
Table 4.2 provides a detailed summary of our results. We report Micro F1 and Macro
F1 scores for each stage ((1) and (2)) and for each intention-specific DBN. Note that the
“intending” class is, almost always, the minority class. We also compare our average ROC
AUC scores to those achieved by a discriminative classifier (SVM, see details below).

As can be seen, different intentions achieved significantly different Micro F1 and
Macro F1 scores. BI’s score is the lowest, whereas WI’s score is the highest. A possible
explanation for BI’s performance is that applying for a loan is an intention that is oftentimes not publicly shared in SNs. However, other non-publicly shared intentions such as
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JI scored significantly better than BI. This can be attributed to the fact that we were able to
find other strong predictors for JI which don’t depend on user-generated content, whereas
for BI we failed to do so.
Figure 4.3 compares our average ROC AUC scores to those of a Support Vector Machine classifier (SVM, RBF kernel). Imputation of missing values was done using scikitlearn’s IterativeImputer, a multivariate imputation method; it is currently considered the
best imputation method offered by scikit-learn that can work with mixed datasets (i.e. numeric and categorical features). Note that because BNs are able to work directly with
incomplete datasets, we did not need to perform any imputation on our datasets when fed
to our BN models. As seen in Figure 4.3, our models outperform a SVM classifier on all
five intentions, though the differences between the two classifiers vary between intentions.
A possible explanation for those differences is the varying number of dependencies among
each model’s variables, or the existence of dependencies that are of specific importance
for each inference task. Another possible explanation is the varying number of missing
values within the features used for each intention’s inference task.
When comparing Micro F1 and Macro F1 scores achieved in different stages ((1) and
(2)) using the same DBN, we can see that the differences are more pronounced for PI and
JI. This can be attributed to the underlying differences between different intentions. As
evidenced by our data, intentions such as WI and VI can be seen as “continuous intentions”
in the sense that the period of time between intention formation and completion of the
associated behavior is longer than for other intentions; the persistence rate (participants
who report the same intention in both the first and the second wave) of such intentions is
significantly higher than rates reported for PI or JI. Another explanation for the varying
differences is the different set of determinants of each intention. While the importance
of some of those determinants stems from their intra-slice values (that is, their values at
a given point in time), the importance of others is derived from a combination of intraslice values and inter-slice change patterns between slices. For instance, various features
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related to non user-generated content serve as excellent predictors of PI in (2), but only as
solid predictors in (1). In a similar manner, the change in different MISC features such as
attributes’ visibility levels between (1) and (2) serve as an important predictor of JI in (2)
(and for obvious reasons, can not be used for JI’s inference in (1)).
0.85
0.8
0.75
0.7
0.65
0.6
0.55
JI

WI

BI
DBN

VI

PI

SVM

Figure 4.3: Average ROC AUC scores

4.7

Related work

Inference of personal attributes using SN data has been extensively researched. Inferring
users’ personality type was investigated in [45, 46] using regression models and Twitter/Facebook data, respectively. Youyou et al. [111] showed that automatic inference
methods that rely on Facebook likes achieve better prediction accuracy than those achieved
by asking the users’ friends. Staiano et al. [105] used data gathered through smartphones
such as calls and texts; their results significantly vary across different personality dimensions.
Demographic attributes’ inference is another well-studied topic, with age and gender
being the most researched attributes [100, 118].
A related stream of research focuses on psychological and mental conditions. Depression is the most researched condition, followed by anxiety and stress [30, 38].
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The common denominator of all the above works is that they focus on attributes that
are either static (their values rarely change), non-self controlled, or both.
Inference of self-controlled attributes has also been extensively studied. However,
such works focus on the inference of opinions and attitudes [29, 90] rather than behavioral
attributes. While a substantial amount of work does study different types of behavioral attributes, their goals are different than ours. Such works study general correlations between
network or linguistic features and a given behavior, identify the prevalence of a certain
behavior among the general population, or classify SN textual objects such as tweets or
posts. For example, while there exists a considerable amount of work about the use of SNs
for monitoring public health, none of those works aims at inferring vaccination intent of a
given SN user at a given point in time. Rather, existing works analyze collective sentiment
towards vaccinations [81], track the spread of infectious diseases [68], or perform classification of stand-alone SN objects according to vaccination attitudes or intentions of the
object’s creator [8, 55].
Inferring time-varying, behavioral attributes using public SN data has therefore been
hardly researched, with two exceptions: voting intentions and online purchase intentions.
There are several key differences between this work and prior ML work on PI. First, the
majority of existing works examine general buying preferences rather than time-varying
PIs [119]. Other works try to infer PI of stand-alone SN objects (content-centric) rather
than PI of SN users (user-centric), an approach which is inherently biased [10, 51]. Note
that [10]’s test set is perfectly balanced; such a test-set composition is far from being
representative of any real-world tweet set as the vast majority of tweets do not reflect a PI.
The remaining works that do try to infer a user-centric, time-varying PI use data derived
solely from E-commerce platforms. Such data is both platform-specific, and oftentimes
considered private (session logs, for example), unlike our use of public SN data [83]. The
closest work to ours is [77] which infers PI of Pinterest users using static and temporal
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features. However, they only consider Pinterest users (31% of Americans 2 ); furthermore,
they only consider online purchases and do not differentiate between different productcategories.

2

https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/04/07/social-media-use-in-2021/
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and open problems
In this final chapter, we briefly review our conclusions and offer some directions for future
research.

5.1

Privacy-preserving data sharing

In Chapter 2, we presented PRShare, an interorganizational data-sharing framework that
protects the privacy of data owners, data clients, and data subjects. In designing PRShare,
we introduced the novel concept of Attribute-Based Encryption With Oblivious Attribute
Translation (OTABE), which may be of independent interest. Our experimental results
indicate that the performance of our OTABE-based data-sharing framework is competitive
with that of earlier MA-ABE schemes that provide less sophisticated privacy guarantees.
One natural open question is whether it is possible to relax one or more assumptions
that PRShare relies on. For example, can the proxies in PRShare be malicious?
We plan to investigate connections between the techniques developed for PRShare and
OTABE and the areas of blockchain systems, smart contracts, and cryptocurrencies. One
such connection may enable the use of malicious proxies: We conjecture that existing
work on smart contracts [12, 113] can be combined with fair-exchange protocols [6, 7, 42]
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to remove the assumption that proxies in OTABE are honest but curious. Conversely, we
plan to use OTABE to improve existing blockchain access-control mechanisms.
Another natural goal for future work is to demonstrate the power and applicability of
OTABE in concrete applications. We plan to provide one such demonstrations by implementing a credit-report-management system that makes essential use of blockchains and
OTABE.

5.2

Social-network mining to predict voting behavior

In Chapter 3, we presented a novel approach to predicting the voting behavior of Facebook
users based on a BN model that combines diverse yet complementary types of information
about the user. In contrast to previous works, we made use of data about ordinary Facebook
users, thus avoiding the bias entailed in cherry-picked datasets that are limited to politically
active users such as those who are most active on Twitter. Using a semi-supervised method,
we applied our model to the case of the 2016 U.S. elections, achieving promising results
despite large amounts of missing data.
Interesting avenues for future research include augmenting the model with additional
behavioral and interest-based traits, combining more complex measures of the network
neighborhood, and adding temporal features that capture how various attributes change
over time. Temporal features may be particularly useful in election-oriented applications,
examples of which include identifying swing voters by examining whether users’ political opinions are consistent over time and measuring the extent to which a specific event
influences a user’s voting intentions.
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5.3

Inferring behavioral intentions of social-network users

In Chapter 4, we presented a new, BN-based methodology for inferring the intentions
of SN users. We reconceived SN users using DBNs and built intention-specific DBN
models that can capture the temporal nature of the human decision-making process. Our
DBN models also handle common challenges in SN-based inference, including incomplete
datasets, unlabeled data, and bidirectional influence. We evaluated our methodology on
multiple real-world inference tasks and multi-wave SN data, achieving promising results
despite the use of highly imbalanced, incomplete datasets.
Interesting directions for further related work include the use of higher-order DBNs
and decision-specific sampling rates. Specifically, we plan to explore the combination of
advanced SN features such as photos and videos.

125

Bibliography
[1] Health insurance portability and accountability act. https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/privacy/laws-regulations/index.html, 1996.
[2] Cambridge analytica and facebook:

The scandal and the fallout so far.

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-scandalfallout.html, 2018.
[3] Social media use in 2018. https://www.pewinternet.org/2018/03/01/social-mediause-in-2018/, 2018.
[4] Joseph A. Akinyele, Christina Garman, Ian Miers, Matthew W. Pagano, Michael
Rushanan, Matthew Green, and Aviel D. Rubin. Charm: a framework for rapidly
prototyping cryptosystems. Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, 3(2):111–128,
2013.
[5] Joseph A. Akinyele, Matthew W. Pagano, Matthew D. Green, Christoph U.
Lehmann, Zachary N. J. Peterson, and Aviel D. Rubin. Securing electronic medical records using attribute-based encryption on mobile devices. In 1st Workshop
on Security and Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile Devices, pages 75–86. ACM,
2011.
[6] Marcin Andrychowicz, Stefan Dziembowski, Daniel Malinowski, and Lukasz
Mazurek. Fair two-party computations via bitcoin deposits. In 18th Interna126

tional Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, pages 105–121.
Springer, 2014.
[7] Marcin Andrychowicz, Stefan Dziembowski, Daniel Malinowski, and Lukasz
Mazurek. Secure multiparty computations on bitcoin. In 38th Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 443–458. IEEE, 2016.
[8] Eiji Aramaki, Sachiko Maskawa, and Mizuki Morita. Twitter catches the flu: detecting influenza epidemics using twitter. In 12th Conference on Empirical Methods
in Natural Language Processing, pages 1568–1576. ACM, 2011.
[9] Giuseppe Ateniese, Kevin Fu, Matthew Green, and Susan Hohenberger. Improved
proxy re-encryption schemes with applications to secure distributed storage. In 12th
Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, pages 29–43. IEEE, 2005.
[10] Samed Atouati, Xiao Lu, and Mauro Sozio. Negative purchase intent identification
in twitter. In 29th International Conference on World Wide Web, pages 2796–2802.
ACM, 2020.
[11] Nuttapong Attrapadung, Benoı̂t Libert, and Elie de Panafieu. Expressive key-policy
attribute-based encryption with constant-size ciphertexts. In 14th International
Conference on Practice and Theory in Public-Key Cryptography, pages 90–108.
Springer, 2011.
[12] Asaph Azaria, Ariel Ekblaw, Thiago Vieira, and Andrew Lippman. Medrec: Using
blockchain for medical data access and permission management. In 2nd International Conference on Open and Big Data, pages 25–30. ACM, 2016.
[13] Johannes Bachhuber, Christian Koppeel, Jeronim Morina, Kim Rejström, and
David Steinschulte. Us election prediction: A linguistic analysis of US twitter users.

127

In Designing Networks for Innovation and Improvisation, pages 55–63. Springer,
2016.
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